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Ample psychological studies demonstrate that emotions provide reasons 
for action and are powerful drivers of a host of behaviors, including 
criminal acts. Studies further establish that experiencing intense emotions 
might impair actors’ judgment and decision-making, sometimes 
culminating in committing homicide.  
Existing criminal law doctrines only partially correspond to these 
findings. They recognize mostly anger and fear as underlying the excuses of 
provocation, imperfect self-defense, and duress by mitigating murder 
charges to manslaughter or otherwise excusing offenders. Currently, 
however, no doctrine recognizes compassion as a basis for mitigation. 
Under existing laws, an actor who intentionally kills a terminally ill or 
severely disabled close family member, wholly out of compassion for the 
victim, commits the crime of murder. The actor’s motive to end the victim’s 
suffering is irrelevant for determining the scope of criminal responsibility. 
In recent years, legal scholars have developed a new field of study 
focusing on the interplay between law and the emotions, including among 
others, in the realm of criminal law. This Article contributes to existing 
literature in this area by suggesting that compassion is yet another emotion 
that may trigger certain actions. Advocating the adoption of a statutory 
affirmative defense that is grounded in compassion, this Article argues that 
recognizing this excuse is consistent with the rationales and reasoning 
underlying criminal law’s recognition of existing emotion-based excuses. 
This Article develops the theoretical and doctrinal bases for endorsing a 
compassion-based partial excuse by advancing three arguments. First, it 
contends that experiencing compassion towards a close family member 
might affect an actor’s judgment and decision-making, motivating them to 
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kill. Second, it argues that from a policy-based perspective, recognizing a 
compassion-based excuse is normatively warranted because while the 
killing is neither justified nor fully excused, it is an understandable reaction 
given the circumstances the actor was facing. Third, this Article outlines 
some necessary constraints on the scope and limits of the partial excuse to 
ensure that it is applicable only in appropriate cases, where actors 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 27, 2015, Bonnie Liltz, a fifty-six-year-old Illinois woman, 
killed her twenty-eight-year-old daughter Courtney by intentionally 











administering her an overdose of medication.1 Liltz adopted Courtney, who 
suffered from severe developmental disabilities and cerebral palsy, when 
Courtney was five-years-old, and according to witnesses’ testimonies, had 
been a loving mother.2 Liltz was Courtney’s sole caregiver, and throughout 
her life changed her diapers, fed her through a tube, bathed and dressed her, 
lifted her in and out of her wheelchair, administered medications, and took 
her to medical appointments.3 Three years prior to the killing, Liltz had been 
diagnosed with cancer, which required her to undergo surgery. While Liltz 
was hospitalized, she was compelled to leave Courtney in a nursing home, 
in which she was not well taken care of and seemed very unhappy.4 Shortly 
before the killing, Liltz had undergone a colostomy bag surgery, due to 
ongoing complications from her illness.5 
Liltz was initially charged with first-degree murder, under Illinois law, 
but later entered a guilty plea to one count of involuntary manslaughter of a 
family member in exchange for the state’s recommendation that the trial 
court sentence her only to four years’ probation and mental counseling.6 
Defendant stated in allocution that on the day of the homicide, she had 
awoken with severe abdominal pain and uncontrollable diarrhea, and her 
stomach was “indented,” which her gastroenterologist explained was a sign 
that her intestines were failing.7 At that moment, defendant believed that 
she was dying and had decided to kill Courtney and commit suicide because 
she was terrified that after her death, Courtney would not receive proper 
palliative care.8 While Liltz had injected both herself and Courtney with a 
combination of four medications, Courtney died and Liltz had survived.9  
Defense counsel argued for mitigation, claiming that Liltz acted with 
compassion, care, and unconditional love; thought she was dying; and 
believed, “reasonably or unreasonably, that she had no other choice.”10 
Importantly, the prosecutor was willing to show compassion towards Liltz 
and recommended to the court a probation-only sentence, without any 
prison time. 11  However, the trial court rejected the prosecution’s 
recommendation and instead sentenced Liltz to four years in prison.12  
 
1. People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶¶ 4–6. 
2. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 6, 9. 
3. Id. at ¶ 6. 
4. Id. at ¶ 7. 
5. Id. at ¶ 6. 
6. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3.  
7. Id. at ¶ 8. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at ¶ 4. 
10. Id. at ¶ 12. 
11. Id. at ¶ 2. 
12. Id. at ¶ 13 (noting that the court took into account both mitigating and aggravating factors, 
including that the victim was physically handicapped and that the defendant was a family member in a 












Liltz appealed her sentence, arguing that the trial court had abused its 
discretion by ignoring the ample evidence in mitigation and imposing a term 
of imprisonment despite the state’s recommendation of a probation-only 
sentence. 13  The court of appeals affirmed both the judgment and the 
sentence, finding that the trial court properly weighed both mitigating and 
aggravating factors.14 Liltz committed suicide two days before she was due 
to report to prison.15 
Cases like Liltz, where actors kill terminally ill or severely disabled loved 
family members wholly out of compassion, in order to end their pain and 
suffering, challenge us to ask whether the criminal law ought to recognize 
a statutory defense that would provide a doctrinal basis for mitigating 
murder charges to a lesser form of homicide.16  
Ample scholarly writings address the questions of voluntary euthanasia 
and assisted suicide, where deceased explicitly request to die, asking others 
to actively assist their killing or help them commit suicide.17 Only scant 
scholarly attention, however, has been devoted to examining the scope of 
criminal responsibility in cases like Liltz, involving non-voluntary 
euthanasia, namely, circumstances where victims never requested to die.18 
This Article aims to fill this gap by exclusively focusing on these mercy 
killings, which are currently viewed as murder.19 Consciously avoiding the 
euthanasia terminology, this Article coins the phrase “compassionate 
homicide” to refer to these cases.20 
Considering whether defendants’ compassion towards the victim ought 
to play any role in determining the scope of their criminal responsibility 
calls for delving into the growing scholarly interest in the relationship 
 
13. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 19. 
14. Id. at ¶ 21. 
15. See George Houde, Woman who Killed Self Before Prison Term for Daughter’s Death in 
Despair After Judge Rejected Medical Request: Sister, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.chicagot 
ribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-disabled-daughter-killed-bonnie-liltz-cremation-20171128-story.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/N3PW-D2GW]. 
16. See infra Part IV.B for further discussion of the proposed defense’s element “wholly out of 
compassion,” including the question of whether the partial excuse should also be expanded to cover 
cases where actors killed “mostly,” rather than “wholly” out of compassion. 
17. For discussion of the difference between voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntary 
euthanasia, see infra Part I.A. 
18. For an excellent discussion of compassion as a potential defense for assisted suicide cases, 
and the possible implications of expanding the scope of such defense to voluntary euthanasia, see R.A. 
Duff, Criminal Responsibility and the Emotions: If Fear and Anger Can Exculpate, Why Not 
Compassion?, 58 INQUIRY 189, 210 (2015).  
19. For further explanation of this choice, see infra Part I.A. 
20. Given the different types of euthanasia, using this term is confusing. The choice to use 
“compassionate homicide” captures not only the understanding that compassion motivates these killings 
but also that adopting the defense would result only in partially excusing a homicide as opposed to 
complete acquittal. See Shai Lavi, Justice, Plurality, and Criminal Law: A Review of Alan Brudner’s 
Punishment and Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Law, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 439, 443 (2011) 
(book review). 











between law and the emotions in general, and the role that emotions may 
play in underpinning criminal excuses in particular. 21  To consider 
compassion’s role in criminal law, this Article draws on insights gained 
from psychological research on compassion and specifically familial 
compassion. 22  The latter is broadly defined as a caretaker’s desire to 
alleviate or end the suffering of terminally ill or severely disabled close 
family member and the motivation to act upon this desire.23  
Psychological research on the role that various emotions might play in 
affecting actors’ judgment and decision-making has significantly developed 
in recent decades.24 Ample studies demonstrate that emotions are potent, 
pervasive, and predictable drivers of decision-making.25 Research further 
establishes the mechanisms through which powerful emotions not only 
shape individuals’ judgments and choices, but also motivate them to engage 
in certain behaviors, including lethal ones.26 Put differently, emotions often 
explain the reasons for people’s actions.  
Criminal law only partially comports with these psychological findings; 
doctrines such as duress, imperfect self-defense and provocation recognize 
the role that fear and anger play in either exculpating or partially excusing 
defendants who were motivated to commit crimes triggered by these 
emotions.27 Existing criminal law doctrines, however, do not acknowledge 
that other emotions, including compassion, may provide grounds for 
recognizing additional criminal excuses.28  Criminal law’s recognition of 
some emotions, but not others, as bases for mitigation, raises the question 
whether this disparate treatment is warranted, and whether the law should 
take into account the effect of additional emotions on criminal conduct by 
adopting new excuses.29 Conceding that a host of emotions might motivate 
homicide, this Article contends that compassion, and particularly familial 
compassion, may also ground a partial excuse.  
Criminal law doctrines currently preclude any excuse—whether 
complete or partial—when actors kill gravely-ill or severely disabled family 
 
21. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996) (describing the mechanistic and evaluative conceptions of emotions to 
explain the scope of substantive criminal law doctrines including provocation, self-defense, duress, and 
insanity). For additional work in the area of law and the emotions see infra Part III.A. 
22. See infra Part II for discussion of psychological research on compassion. 
23. See Jennifer L. Goetz, Dacher Keltner & Emiliana Simon-Thomas, Compassion: An 
Evolutionary Analysis and Empirical Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 351 (2010). 
24. See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 799 
(2015).  
25. Id. at 816. 
26. For further discussion of these psychological studies see infra Part II. 
27. See infra Part I.B. 
28. See infra Part I.B. 












members to end their suffering. 30  Put differently, no existing criminal 
defense recognizes compassion as grounds for mitigating murder charges to 
manslaughter.31 Moreover, the law generally rejects the idea that actors’ 
purportedly beneficial motive for committing compassionate homicide 
diminishes the scope of their criminal responsibility.32  
Case law concerning compassionate homicide, however, demonstrates a 
deviation from black letter law. Compassionate actors’ criminal 
responsibility is often significantly reduced, but this practice varies across 
different courts.33  There are numerous examples where decision-makers 
refuse to convict compassionate killers as murderers, despite the absence of 
any principled basis for mitigation. 34  While often a murder charge is 
mitigated to manslaughter, sometimes it is even mitigated to involuntary 
manslaughter. 35  Yet in other cases, a claim for mitigation is denied 
altogether, resulting in a murder conviction.36 In addition, a compassionate 
motive is sometimes taken into account as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing.37 The upshot of a lack of a doctrinal framework underlying the 
theoretical basis for mitigation is inconsistent and unequal treatment of 
similarly situated defendants.  
To address this doctrinal shortcoming in existing law, this Article’s key 
argument is that the emotion of compassion ought to serve as grounds for 
adopting a new emotion-based partial excuse which would allow mitigating 
murder charges to manslaughter.38 To support this argument, this Article 
examines insights from psychological research demonstrating that 
compassion is not merely a feeling but rather an emotional state that 
motivates action to help others. These findings might explain why 
compassion might motivate some actors to end the suffering of close family 
members.  
Psychological findings, however, are insufficient in and of themselves 
for recognizing a compassion-based defense. The question of what types of 
 
30. See infra Part I.B. 
31. In jurisdictions that replaced the provocation defense with the extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance defense (EMED), arguably cases of compassionate homicide may fall under the latter. For 
further discussion of the possibility of applying EMED in compassionate homicide cases, see Part I.B, 
demonstrating that while theoretically EMED’s language might provide a defense, most courts have not 
interpreted it to do so. For the typical elements of an EMED defense see MODEL PENAL CODE § 
210.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
32. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing hate crimes as an exception to the general rule that motives 
generally do not affect the scope of criminal liability).  
33. See infra Part I.C. 
34. See infra Part I.C and accompanying notes for examples of such cases. 
35. People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶ 2. 
36. See infra Part IV.H (discussing the Lance Anderson case). 
37. See infra Part I.D (discussing mitigation at sentencing). 
38. I later explain in detail why I advocate the adoption of a partial excuse that merely mitigates 
criminal liability rather than a complete excuse that results in complete acquittal. See infra Part III.B.3. 











actors deserve mitigation is inherently a normative, rather than an empirical, 
question. Conceding that a compassion-based excuse must rest on 
arguments supported by criminal law theory itself, this Article develops the 
theoretical basis underlying this defense. It demonstrates that recognizing a 
compassion-based excuse is consistent with similar reasoning and rationales 
that underpin other emotion-based excuses that the criminal law already 
recognizes, including provocation, duress, and imperfect self-defense. 39 
The latter defenses acknowledge that actors may experience objectively 
reasonable emotions, yet sometimes overreact by committing unreasonable 
acts. Endorsing the proposed partial excuse follows similar reasoning; 
defendant’s compassion for the victim is a reasonable feeling given the dire 
circumstances that defendant was facing. Yet even reasonable people may 
act unreasonably on one particular occasion and kill. While the killing is 
neither justified nor fully excused, it is somewhat an understandable 
reaction. As such, it supports reducing defendant’s criminal responsibility 
from murder to a lower form of homicide.40  
Undoubtedly, some readers may find this provocative proposal 
unwarranted. Indeed, there are moral, ethical, religious, and evidentiary 
objections to recognizing a compassion-based excuse. These include, 
among others, the categorical value of the sanctity of life, which is equally 
important for victims with severe disabilities or terminal illnesses; 
utilitarian-based arguments, such as the need for general deterrence to 
prevent an increase in homicides ostensibly driven by compassion; and 
slippery slope concerns.41 This Article directly confronts these concerns, 
without attempting to minimize them, by conceding that they warrant 
careful consideration. Yet, the fact that compassionate homicide is a 
difficult subject should not result in avoiding it altogether. Instead, this 
Article confronts the challenging topic head-on, suggesting that once the 
theoretical basis for a compassion-based excuse is established, it is 
necessary to consider some doctrinal constraints to limit its scope. Narrowly 
defining the defense’s elements would ensure that it is not overly expansive 
and is applicable only in appropriate cases.  
Moreover, this Article responds to potential arguments that even if 
mitigation might be normatively warranted, it should only be considered at 
the sentencing phase of the trial, rather than at the trial’s guilt-determination 
phase. It argues that the preferable legal path to address compassionate 
homicide is for legislatures to define in advance the elements of an 
affirmative defense. A statutory solution is superior to leaving mitigation to 
 
39. See infra Part III.B.3. 
40. See infra Part III.B.3. 












prosecutorial and judicial discretion because the treatment of compassionate 
homicide implicates value-based choices which are best left to legislatures. 
To be clear, advocating the recognition of a compassion-based excuse 
nowhere suggests that compassionate homicide may be justified, resulting 
in complete acquittal. The premise underlying this Article’s thesis is that 
compassionate homicide is an unjustifiable act, that cannot be fully excused, 
and ought to remain a criminal offense.42 This Article makes a more modest 
claim, advocating only a partial excuse that might mitigate murder charges 
to manslaughter and result in less stringent sentences. Moreover, this Article 
nowhere argues that all compassionate homicide claims will necessarily 
result in mitigation. Instead, its goal is merely to provide juries and judges 
with the option to consider a compassion-based defense. Decision-makers 
will remain free to reject the defense’s compassionate homicide theory. But 
the excuse would ensure that, doctrinally, similarly situated actors would be 
similarly treated by the law, bringing much-needed consistency into this 
area. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the treatment of 
compassionate homicide under existing laws. It explains why current 
doctrines, including provocation and necessity, are mostly unable to offer a 
basis for mitigation in these cases. It further reveals the divergence between 
law and practice, under which judges and juries often treat compassionate 
killers leniently yet without doctrinal support, resulting in inconsistencies 
between similar cases. This part also discusses various rationales for 
upholding the legal status quo, elaborating on arguments against mitigating 
the criminal responsibility of compassionate killers. Part II turns to 
psychological research on compassion, including familial compassion, 
comparing and contrasting compassion with other emotions. It then explains 
how compassion might motivate killings in some cases, as it is a powerful 
affective state that might impair individuals’ thought processes, decision-
making, and judgments. Part III develops and defends the legal theory 
underlying a compassion-based excuse by identifying the moral and 
theoretical principles that support its recognition. Drawing on insights 
gleaned from psychological research on compassion, yet assessing them 
from an evaluative perspective, this part posits that adopting a compassion-
based excuse is normatively warranted. It further demonstrates that this 
defense comports with the reasoning underlying comparable emotion-based 
excuses such as provocation. Part IV considers some necessary limits on the 
applicability of a compassion-based excuse. It emphasizes that the scope of 
 
42. For general discussion on the distinction between justifications and excuses see Joshua 
Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1155, 1157–58 (1987). See also Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search 
of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 436–37 (1982).  











this partial excuse must be carefully cabined to avoid potential abuses. It 
outlines several requirements that would constrain the availability of the 
defense only to appropriate cases where mitigation is indeed normatively 
warranted. 
I. COMPASSIONATE HOMICIDE UNDER EXISTING LAW 
Compassionate homicide is not a new phenomenon, as society has long 
grappled with the reality of actors who kill close family members to end 
their suffering.43 As contemporary advancements in medical procedures and 
treatments result in prolonging and sustaining life, more legal issues 
surrounding end of life decisions arise and are likely to become even more 
prominent.44 Compassionate homicide raises not only complex moral and 
ethical conundrums but also challenging questions concerning the scope of 
the actor’s criminal liability, the grading of the crime, and the level of 
deserved punishment. Moreover, from criminal law’s perspective, the 
motivation for compassionate homicide is puzzling given the paradox of 
harm infliction; actors inflict on people they love the gravest and 
irreversible harm, in order to relieve them from experiencing another harm, 
namely, the suffering resulting from living with a terminal illness or severe 
disability.45 
Existing criminal law doctrines answer these difficult yet nuanced 
questions with a simple bright line rule: intentional killing of another human 
being amounts to murder in all American jurisdictions. The motive for 
intentional killing may sometimes reduce criminal liability in cases where 
the law recognizes defenses such as self-defense, provocation, necessity and 
duress.46 Yet beyond the scope of these statutorily recognized defenses, the 
actor’s motive, whether it is benign or nefarious, love or hate, largely does 
not affect the scope of criminal responsibility, even if it may be taken into 
account as one mitigating or aggravating circumstance at sentencing.47 In 
 
43. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803, 806, 
811–812 (1993) (observing that the phrase nonvoluntary euthanasia refers to a person incapable of 
communicating her consent, where the killing is motivated entirely by compassion for the victims’ 
suffering). 
44. See Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Democratic 
World: A Legal Overview, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 5 (2003). 
45. In circumstances where the victim’s death was imminent and their suffering intolerable, 
arguably no paradox exists, because hastening death is beneficial for the victim. For the paradox of harm 
argument see THE LAW COMMISSION, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE, 2006-7, HC 30, at 
145 (UK), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat 
a/file/228782/0030.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH84-W2X3].  
46. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 118–19 (8th ed. 2018).  
47. Actor’s motive does affect the scope of criminal liability in hate crimes. See Carissa Byrne 













practice, however, decision-makers are often reluctant to bring to bear 
heavy-handed murder rules in compassionate homicide cases. 48  As the 
discussion below demonstrates, decision-makers often convict 
compassionate actors only of lesser crimes, without any coherent doctrinal 
basis for mitigation. This response can be attributed to the fact that 
communities’ moral and societal perceptions do not always align with the 
stringent legal response, as society’s moral intuitions largely conceive of 
compassionate homicide as less morally blameworthy than other types of 
intentional killings.49 But before describing the inherent tensions arising 
from the apparent discrepancy between law and practice, some 
terminological clarifications are necessary. 
A. Terminology and Scope 
The myriad of terms used, often interchangeably, to address cases where 
actors kill out of compassion, often leads to conceptual confusion. These 
terms are often used synonymously, mistakenly creating the impression that 
they describe similar behaviors. However, terms such as voluntary, 
involuntary, and non-voluntary euthanasia; mercy killing; compassionate 
killing; assisted suicide; and physician-assisted suicide refer to a host of 
distinct fact patterns. Distinguishing between different types of compassion-
motivated killing is imperative both for purposes of conceptual clarity as 
well as for limiting the scope of the argument below. 
At one end of the spectrum are situations involving assisted suicides, in 
which actors provide help to terminally ill or severely disabled individuals 
in ending their own lives. Here, actors are prompted to assist in committing 
suicide by deceased’s explicit requests, for example, by procuring the 
necessary medication. These cases also include physician-assisted suicides, 
in which medical professionals help terminally ill patients end their lives at 
the explicit request of the patients.50 Yet these are not homicide cases, since 
 
discussion of motive’s role at sentencing see id. at 100–09. A compassionate motive may also serve as 
an aggravating circumstance in sentencing, because the actor breached a relationship of trust by taking 
advantage of the victim’s vulnerability. See People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶ 13 (noting 
factors in aggravation, including that the victim was physically handicapped and the defendant was a 
family member in a position of trust). 
48. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Plotting Premeditation’s Demise, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 2, 2012, at 83, 90 n.37 (noting that mercy killers commit premeditated killing, yet prosecutors often 
refuse to prosecute them). 
49. See id.; see also Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Not the Crime but the Cover-Up: A 
Deterrence-Based Rationale for the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula, 86 IND. L.J. 879, 895–96 
(2011). 
50. Physician-assisted cases are often referred to as medical euthanasia. See Edward J. Larson, 
Euthanasia in America—Past, Present, and Future: A Review of A Merciful End and Forced Exit, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (2004) (book review). Oregon and Washington adopted Death with Dignity 
 











actors may only be charged under assisting suicide statutes.51 While assisted 
suicide cases raise many complex moral questions, among others, whether 
the assister was acting in a personal or professional and paid capacity, as 
well as the obligations of medical professionals and their ethical duties in 
cases where health care professionals provided the assistance, this Article 
does not address them, as it solely focuses on homicide cases.  
At the other end of the spectrum are cases where actors actively kill 
terminally ill or severely disabled family members in order to end their pain 
and suffering. When a person is competent to make decisions, and expresses 
an explicit request or desire to die, these cases are typically referred to in 
the literature as voluntary euthanasia. 52  Cases where victims did not 
expressly request to die are further subdivided into non-voluntary and 
involuntary euthanasia. Non-voluntary euthanasia refers to circumstances 
where victims were not competent to make their own decisions regarding 
ending their lives due to grave illness, severe disability, or young age.53 In 
sharp contrast, involuntary euthanasia refers to circumstances where victims 
were competent to express their wishes. A further distinction may be drawn 
between cases where competent victims never expressed any explicit wish 
to die, even if they could have done so, and cases where competent victims 
explicitly objected to dying, manifesting willingness to continue living 
despite the illness or disability, yet actors killed them contrary to their 
wishes.54  
The presence or absence of consent to die stands at the core of the 
distinction between voluntary euthanasia on one hand and non-voluntary 
and involuntary euthanasia on the other.55 Arguably, in voluntary euthanasia 
cases, the voluntariness of deceased’s request to die precludes their status 
 
Acts, which allow for mentally competent terminally ill patients to request and receive a prescription for 
medication to end their lives voluntarily. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 
70.245.020 (2019).  
51. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal History of Medical Aid in Dying: Physician Assisted Death 
in U.S. Courts and Legislatures, 48 N.M. L. REV. 267 (2018) (discussing assisted suicide statutes). 
52. See N. Ferreira, Latest Legal and Social Developments in the Euthanasia Debate: Bad Moral 
Consciences and Political Unrest, 26 MED. & L. 387, 390 (2007) (discussing cases where the actor kills 
a patient in “response to a repeated and informed consent, under certain pre-established conditions, 
according to his/her request and/or will, and through painless means.”).  
53. See Tom L. Beauchamp, The Justification of Physician-Assisted Deaths, 29 IND. L. REV. 
1173, 1176 (1996) (distinguishing between non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, stressing that the 
latter is universally condemned but there are moral justifications for voluntary and non-voluntary 
euthanasia). 
54. See Norman L. Cantor, On Kamisar, Killing, and the Future of Physician-Assisted Death, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1816 (2004).  
55. Additionally, euthanasia may either be active or passive. Passive euthanasia includes 
homicides by omission, namely, situations in which defendants, whether health professionals or family 
members, purposely omit conduct that would have saved life, whereas active euthanasia refers to the 
voluntary act of killing a human being. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 705 (8th ed. 2019). The above distinction is not pertinent to the argument I 












as victims. In contrast, in non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia cases, 
actors commit unilateral actions without the consent or request of deceased 
who are victims in the conventional sense of the term.  
Extensive literature has been devoted to the ethical and legal 
conundrums surrounding assisted suicides and voluntary euthanasia, largely 
focusing on the scope and conditions of consenting adults’ right to die.56 
Here, I do not further engage in these conversations, as the discussion below 
expressly excludes voluntary euthanasia cases.57 In addition, the proposed 
partial excuse that this Article develops explicitly excludes from its scope 
cases of involuntary euthanasia where victims clearly objected to their 
killing, expressing their wish to continue living despite their suffering, yet 
defendants flagrantly opted to disregard these autonomous choices, 
violating victims’ dignity.58  
The remainder of this Article focuses on non-voluntary euthanasia cases, 
where victims lacked the capacity to express their wishes due to an illness, 
disability or young age, as well as cases where victims were legally 
competent but have not explicitly expressed a wish to die. As noted earlier, 
I collectively refer to these cases as “compassionate homicide.”59  
B. The Law: Recognizing Passion, but not Compassion 
Having delineated the types of cases that this Article is concerned with, 
I now turn to examine the divergence between law and practice in the 
treatment of compassionate homicide.  
Broadly speaking, actors’ motive for committing murder largely does not 
matter for determining the scope of their criminal responsibility. Commonly 
referred to as “the irrelevance of motive principle,” the maxim holds that 
the law does not distinguish among malicious or beneficial motivations for 
 
56. See, e.g., Richard Doerflinger, Assisted Suicide: Pro-Choice or Anti-Life?, 19 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 1989, at 16, 16–19; Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide—Even a Very Limited 
Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 741–53 (1995); Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The 
Last Bridge to Active Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 225, 245 (John Keown ed., 1995). 
57. I leave open the question of recognizing a complete excuse for voluntary euthanasia where 
the victim explicitly requested to die. See generally Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of the States: 
The Progress of Glucksberg’s Invitation to States to Address End-of-Life Choice, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1593, 1600–07 (2008) (discussing aid-in-dying statutes, such as Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act, that 
provide a choice for mentally competent, terminally ill patients to seek medication to bring about a 
peaceful and dignified death, and suggesting that more states should adopt such laws to allow terminally 
ill patients to control the timing and manner of their deaths.) 
58. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the exclusion of the defense in cases where the victim 
objected to the killing and expressed a wish to continue living).  
59. See Introduction. 











intentional killings.60 But there are important exceptions to this rule where 
the law recognizes a justification or excuse, such as provocation, extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance, self-defense, duress, or necessity.61 None 
of these defenses, however, apply in compassionate homicide cases.62 
To begin with, the common law’s provocation defense, which remains 
good law in the vast majority of jurisdictions today, allows for mitigating 
murder charges to manslaughter if the actor killed under a heat of passion, 
stemming from adequate provocation and without an opportunity to cool 
off.63 While arguably the term “heat of passion” covers a host of powerful 
emotions, and is not exclusively limited to anger, two reasons account for 
why the provocation defense is inapplicable in compassionate homicide 
cases. First, courts and commentators mostly perceive provocation as an 
anger-based defense, which does not cover actors’ reactions that are 
triggered by other emotions such as fear.64 Second, provocation doctrine 
requires a provoking incident, namely, that deceased engaged in some 
blameworthy behavior amounting to “adequate provocation.”65 Victims of 
compassionate homicide did nothing to provoke actors, as suffering from a 
terminal illness or severe disability is a blameless predicament. The 
provocation defense is, therefore, not only normatively inappropriate but 
also doctrinally inapplicable as an excusatory basis for mitigation in 
compassionate homicides.  
In jurisdictions that have replaced provocation with a defense modeled 
after the Model Penal Code’s Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance 
(EMED), existing statutory language is arguably sufficiently expansive to 
offer an excusatory basis for mitigation in compassionate homicides. 
Providing that a homicide which would otherwise constitute murder 
constitutes manslaughter when it is committed under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
 
60. See Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) 
(observing that commentators stress the irrelevance of motive, arguing against hate crimes liability and 
in support of liability for mercy killing). 
61. Hate crime statutes are a notable exception to the rule that motives generally do not affect 
the scope of criminal liability. For further discussion of motives see infra Part III.B.3. 
62. Admittedly, the defenses of self-defense and duress are inapplicable to compassionate 
homicide cases; while it may be argued that EMED and necessity could cover compassionate homicide, 
in practice that has not been the case, as the discussion below demonstrates. See Boyle v. State, 214 
S.W.3d 250, 253–54 (Ark. 2005). 
63. See Paul H. Robinson, Murder Mitigation in the Fifty-Two American Jurisdictions: A Case 
Study in Doctrinal Interrelation Analysis, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 19, 24 (2014) (noting that only 12 
jurisdictions replaced provocation with the defense of extreme mental or emotional disturbance); 
DRESSLER, supra note 46, at 501. 
64. Self-defense statutes recognize fear as a basis for exculpation. See Michal Buchhandler-
Raphael, Fear-Based Provocation, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1719, 1762 (2018). For a proposal to recognize 
fear as a basis for the provocation defense see id. at 1736–37.  
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Towles, 208 A.3d 988, 1001, 1004 (Pa. 2019) (citing 












explanation or excuse, the Model Penal Code’s proposal for EMED defense 
does not require any provocative incident by the victim.66 However, only 
twelve jurisdictions have adopted some version of EMED; this defense 
cannot apply in the vast majority of jurisdictions, in which the elements of 
the provocation defense must be established.67  
But even in jurisdictions that revised their statutes by adopting some 
version of EMED, this defense mostly does not apply in cases of 
compassionate homicide. In some of these jurisdictions, courts recognize 
that murder charges may be mitigated to manslaughter once juries determine 
that a defendant’s self-control and reason were overborne by various intense 
feelings, including not only anger but also distress, grief, and excessive 
agitation. 68  Yet, despite this broad wording and the fact that statutory 
interpretation itself does not preclude compassionate killing from the scope 
of the defense, case law demonstrates that the EMED defense is mostly used 
either in cases that would otherwise fall under the provocation defense or in 
cases where defendants’ mental disorders fall short of the insanity defense.69 
Moreover, in some jurisdictions that adopted EMED, courts read a 
provocation element into the defense, requiring evidence that defendant 
killed the victim immediately following some provocation, such as physical 
fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon, despite the fact that statutory 
language does not require a provocative incident. 70  Furthermore, some 
jurisdictions go as far as explicitly excluding compassionate homicide from 
the scope of their extreme emotional disturbance defense, stressing that the 
claim that a killing was motivated by love is completely irrelevant because 
mercy killing is not a recognizable defense to murder.71 For example, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court in Boyle v. State affirmed the trial court’s refusal 
to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, upholding defendant’s 
conviction of a capital offense with a sentence of life without parole.72 In 
this case, defendant killed his live-in girlfriend who suffered from various 
health problems that caused her chronic pain, claiming that he suffered from 
an extreme emotional disturbance resulting from watching his beloved 
girlfriend’s suffering.73 Rejecting defendant’s claim, the court held:  
 
66. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
67. See Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial Justification 
and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1039–40 (2011). 
68. See, e.g., State v. Elliott, 411 A.2d 3, 5, 8 (Conn. 1979) (defendant killed his brother arguing 
that the act was motivated by fear). 
69. See Duff, supra note 18, at 208. 
70. See, e.g., Kail v. State, 14 S.W.3d 878, 880 (Ark. 2000); Spann v. State, 944 S.W.2d 537, 
539–40 (Ark. 1997) (holding that in order to receive a manslaughter jury instruction, there must be 
evidence of some provocation). 
71. See Boyle v. State, 214 S.W.3d 250, 253–54 (Ark. 2005). 
72. Id. at 252. 
73. Id. at 254. 











Absent a legally-recognized defense, where a person intentionally 
causes the death of another, his act constitutes murder, and it is 
completely irrelevant that the act was motivated by love rather than 
malice. A humanitarian purpose is neither a defense to murder nor a 
substitute for the passion and provocation necessary to establish 
extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter.74 
The necessity defense is also inapplicable in compassionate homicide 
cases. Characterized as a “residual justification,” the traditional common-
law defense recognizes that certain natural conditions, not humanly created, 
compel an actor to choose the least harmful alternative between two evils.75 
But even in jurisdictions that have statutorily adopted a necessity defense 
that covers human-created conditions, the elements of a necessity claim are 
rigid and extremely difficult to satisfy; 76  actors must face a clear and 
imminent danger, expect that their action will be effective in abating the 
danger they seek to avoid, and show that no effective legal way to avert the 
harm existed, that the harm they caused was less serious than the harm they 
sought to avoid, that lawmakers have not weighed in on their choice of evils 
situation and made a decision that conflicts with that choice, and that their 
own behavior has not contributed to the emergency situation. 77  These 
requirements, however, cannot be met in compassionate homicide cases. 
First, in most jurisdictions, the defense of necessity does not apply in 
homicide cases.78 Second, in balancing the harms stemming from killing the 
victims and the harms suffered by the victims as a result of their illness or 
disability, causing death cannot be viewed as a lesser harm compared with 
the suffering that victims endure. Furthermore, while compassionate killers 
subjectively believe that, given the circumstances, they have no other way 
to alleviate the suffering of their loved ones other than to kill them, thus 
arguably making the killing necessary, this feeling is not supported by 
objective reasons, as in most cases there are viable alternatives to killing.79  
 
74. Id.  
75. See DRESSLER, supra note 46, at 275; see also 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S 
CRIMINAL LAW § 90 (15th ed. Supp. 2019) (“Under the force of extreme circumstances, conduct which 
would otherwise constitute a crime is justifiable and not criminal; the actor engages in the conduct out 
of necessity to prevent a greater harm from occurring.”).  
76. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 503 (2020); People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674 (Colo. App. 
1990).  
77. See DRESSLER, supra note 46, at 273–75. 
78. Id. at 279. 
79. There are no reported cases where defendants raised a necessity defense in compassionate 
homicide cases, but Canadian courts thoroughly examined the elements of this defense and rejected its 
application. See R. v. Latimer, 1995 CanLII 3993 (Can. Sask. C.A.) (involving a father who had killed 
his severely disabled 12-year-old daughter out of compassion). The legal proceedings lasted six years 













Since existing defenses largely fail to provide a doctrinal basis for 
mitigation in compassionate homicide cases, current laws mostly view them 
as murder cases.80 While handed down over thirty years ago, the 1987 North 
Carolina decision in State v. Forrest is still good law, succinctly capturing 
existing stringent legal treatment of compassionate homicide.81 The Forrest 
case concerns a defendant who arrived at the hospital where his terminally 
ill father was hospitalized, and after becoming extremely emotional at the 
sight of his father’s deteriorating medical condition, pulled out a pistol and 
shot him.82 The sobbing and upset defendant did not try to run away, and 
instead cooperated with the police while muttering, “He’s out of his 
suffering. I killed my daddy. He won’t have to suffer anymore. I know they 
can burn me for it, but my dad will not have to suffer anymore.”83 Defendant 
was charged with first-degree murder and the case was submitted to the jury 
on one of four possible verdicts: first-degree murder, second-degree murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, or not guilty.84 After the jury convicted him of 
first-degree murder, defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that there 
was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation.85 While it was 
apparent that defendant was motivated to kill out of compassion, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the verdict, holding that there was 
substantial evidence that the killing was premeditated and deliberated.86 The 
court stressed that defendant’s own statements supported this conclusion, as 
he had stated that “he had thought about putting his father out of his misery 
because he knew he was suffering” and that “he had promised his father that 
he would not let him suffer and that, though he did not think he could do it, 
he just could not stand to see his father suffer any more [sic].”87 The court 
further clarified that the provocation defense could not have provided 
grounds for reducing the degree of the homicide from murder to voluntary 
manslaughter because the seriously ill victim did nothing to provoke the 
defendant’s action.88  
 
murder of his daughter. See id.; R. v. Latimer, 1997 CanLII 11316 (Can. Sask. Q.B.); R. v. Latimer, 
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (Can.); R. v. Latimer, 1998 CanLII 12388 (Can. Sask. C.A.); R. v. Latimer, [2001] 
1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 
80. See, e.g., People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150–51 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that mercy 
killing is not a defense to a murder charge); People v. Johnson, No. A139389, 2015 WL 7012997, at *7 
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015) (noting that mercy killing is not a form of manslaughter recognized under 
California law). 
81. State v. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1987). 
82. Id. at 254. 
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
84. Id.  
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 257–58. 
87. Id. at 258. 
88. Id. at 256. 











The Forrest case is the paradigm example of a decision that stands for 
the proposition that compassionate homicide remains murder in the eyes of 
the law, as defendant’s compassionate motive for the killing did not mitigate 
his criminal responsibility, rendering it any less criminally culpable. 89 
Indeed, conventional wisdom in criminal law is that motives largely do not 
play any role for the purpose of determining actors’ criminal 
responsibility.90 Instead, homicides are graded based solely on defendants’ 
mens rea; according to the Forrest court, since Forrest intended to kill his 
father, that intent justified his conviction of the highest grade of homicide, 
as well as its accompanying stigma and labeling as a murderer. But the role 
that motives ought to play in determining the scope of criminal 
responsibility is in fact more nuanced than these oversimplified 
observations. This Article will revisit motives’ role in Part III, while 
advocating for a compassion-based excuse, which presumes that actors’ 
motives do matter for the purposes of grading homicide offenses.91 
C. The Practice: Inconsistent and Unprincipled Mercy 
The criminal justice system’s treatment of compassionate homicide 
exemplifies an area where a gap emerges between doctrine and practice. 
While legal doctrines categorically deny any basis for mitigation of criminal 
responsibility in compassionate homicide, case law demonstrates 
inconsistencies across the board; in some cases, murder charges are 
significantly reduced, either to manslaughter or even to involuntary 
 
89. See id.; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 55, at 278 (excerpting and discussing the Forrest 
case), 697–717 (discussion of a new criminal excuse for euthanasia). 
90. See Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 449, 472 (2012) (noting that motives are generally insignificant to liability, as opposed to sentencing).  













manslaughter. 92  Other times, however, defendants bear the full heavy 
weight of the criminal justice system and are convicted of murder.93  
To highlight the tension between doctrine and practice and the potential 
for inconsistencies in treatment between similarly situated defendants, 
consider the Liltz case discussed earlier.94 There, the killing was committed 
following long-term caretaking responsibilities, and defendant claimed that 
she was motivated to kill her daughter wholly out of compassion because 
she was deeply concerned that her daughter would not receive proper care 
at a nursing home.95 While the prosecutor exercised merciful discretion by 
recommending a probation-only sentence, the sentencing judge insisted on 
sending defendant to four years in prison, treating her motivation as an 
aggravating circumstance.96 
The doctrinally muddled treatment of the Liltz case is disconcerting, as 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial discretion resulted in strikingly 
different outcomes. This disparate treatment raises concerns that similarly 
situated defendants might be treated differently by the criminal justice 
system. The fact that some compassionate killers are perceived by 
prosecutors, judges, and juries as deserving mercy, but others as 
undeserving, raises the question of what might account for the difference in 
decision-makers’ perceptions.  
These concerns are further exemplified by comparing and contrasting the 
Liltz and Forrest cases.97  Similar to Liltz, Forrest also killed his father 
wholly out of compassion. In fact, the Forrest case arguably suggests an 
even stronger justification for recognizing a compassion-based excuse 
because Forrest’s father was a terminally ill patient whose death was 
 
92. See, for example, the case of Kimberly Lightwine, a Missouri mother who killed her autistic 
and blind son. Initially charged with second degree murder, Lightwine pled guilty to involuntary 
manslaughter, following a plea agreement. Harrison Keegan, Mom Pleads Guilty to Killing Blind, 
Autistic Son; She Could Be Free in 4 Months, USA TODAY (May 10, 2018, 7:14 PM), https://www.usato 
day.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/05/10/autistic-teen-killed-missouri-mother-pleads-guilty-his-dea 
th/6 00151002/ [https://perma.cc/CLZ2-SBHA]. See also the New York case against Gigi Jordan who 
killed her autistic eight-year-old son, was convicted of manslaughter, and was sentenced to eighteen 
years in prison. Sarah Kaplan, The Millionaire Mom Who Poisoned Her Autistic Son and Called It a 
Mercy Killing, WASH. POST (May 29, 2015, 5:11 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning 
-mix/wp/2015/05/29/a-murder-or-a-mercy-killing-the-tangled-and-troubling-trial-of-gigi-jordan/?nore 
direct=on&utm_term=.6bee2ec41ad6 [https://perma.cc/LS8M-732X]. For further discussion of the need 
for consistency and uniformity in sentencing while minimizing the role of judicial discretion at the 
sentencing phase, see infra Part III.C.2.  
93. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, No. A139389, 2015 WL 7012997, at *1–5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 
12, 2015) (defendant killed her 8-year-old severely disabled daughter and was convicted of second 
degree murder); People v. Anderson, No. B276741, 2017 WL 3326831, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 
2017). 
94. People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U. For discussion, see supra notes 1–15 and 
accompanying text. 
95. Id. at ¶ 12. 
96. Id. at ¶ 2. 
97. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Forrest case). 











imminent, whereas Liltz’s daughter was severely disabled but not terminally 
ill.  
Comparing and contrasting the Liltz and Forrest cases raises a worry that 
this difference stems not from principled distinctions between different 
cases but rather from unrelated factors that ought to be irrelevant for the 
grade of the homicide. One possible explanation is that gender might play a 
role in this context, with female defendants being treated more leniently, but 
only if their behavior is consistent with gender-biased constructions of 
femininity, motherhood and caretaking roles.98 Another explanation rests 
with decision-makers’ own emotions, and particularly feelings of empathy 
towards some, but not all, compassionate killers. These emotions lead 
decision-makers to find ways to avoid condemnation of compassionate 
killers as murderers in cases where they find them worthy of merciful 
treatment. Yet an alternative explanation is that divergent outcomes might 
stem from a conceptual difference in personal worldviews of the prosecutors 
who handle different compassionate homicide cases, which could occur 
even in the same jurisdiction.99 The Liltz prosecutor acted in the spirit of a 
social worker (which was, until very recently, an infrequent prosecutorial 
model in our existing over-punitive criminal justice system), whereas the 
Forrest prosecutor applied a heavy-handed tactic.100 I will further critique 
the overbroad prosecutorial discretion in compassionate homicide cases in 
Part III, while developing the proposal for a new excuse.101 Before moving 
to consider whether compassion ought to play any role in determining the 
grade of a homicide, it is pertinent to consider the various rationales that are 
commonly used for upholding the legal status quo.  
D. Arguments for Upholding Current Law 
The idea of recognizing a compassion-based partial excuse is not only 
provocative but also generates a wide array of counterarguments that 
vehemently reject the possibility of providing a doctrinal basis for 
mitigating compassionate murders to manslaughter. Let me concede right 
 
98. See generally Jamie R. Abrams, The Feminist Case for Acknowledging Women’s Acts of 
Violence, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287, 315 (2016) (addressing gender-based constructions). 
99. I thank Professor Joshua Dressler for directing me to this explanation. 
100. For alternative models of prosecution see Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1129–30 (2005) (advocating a new prosecutorial model under which the 
prosecutor serves as a problem-solver). In recent years, the phenomenon of progressive prosecutors, 
including more merciful prosecutors is gaining traction. See Angela J. Davis, The Progressive 
Prosecutor: An Imperative for Criminal Justice Reform, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 8 (2018); 
Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3542792 (describing the rise of the so called progressive 
prosecutor movement, of which merciful prosecutors are an integral part). 












away that there are valid reasons for refusing to recognize such an excuse. 
Rather than trying to dismiss these arguments or minimize their strength, 
my goal here is to lay them out up front by directly confronting them. 
Indeed, ample justifications, grounded in policy-based arguments, support 
the objection to allowing compassionate killers to bring before a jury a 
compassion-based partial excuse. These generally fall under theoretical, 
practical, and evidentiary-based rationales.  
1. Theoretical Rationales 
A lively scholarly debate on the question of whether the law ought to 
legalize voluntary euthanasia emerged as early as the 1950s with professor 
Yale Kamisar’s oft-cited article on objections to mercy killing legislation.102 
While Kamisar mostly focused on voluntary euthanasia in the context of 
physician-assisted deaths, one of his main concerns was that legalizing the 
latter would ultimately lead to a slippery slope, which would result in an 
increase in non-voluntary euthanasia. Additionally, many of the arguments 
against voluntary euthanasia apply even more forcefully in the context of 
non-voluntary euthanasia which is my focus here. Kamisar’s position rests 
on utilitarian arguments against voluntary euthanasia, concluding that a 
cost-benefit calculus tips the scale towards rejecting the idea of legalizing 
the practice. The potential harms of opening the door towards voluntary 
euthanasia, posits Kamisar, outweigh the benefits that allowing it would 
provide to some people.103 
Utilitarian-based rationales by and large reject an excusatory basis for 
compassionate homicide.104 Justifications grounded in the need for criminal 
law’s general deterrence (as opposed to specific deterrence), might suggest 
that mitigation should not be provided in these cases. Utilitarian punishment 
theorists generally reject criminal excuses that are grounded in exercising 
mercy towards defendants because doing so belies the purpose of 
punishment.105 Under a utilitarian account of punishment, recognizing a 
doctrinal basis for mitigation in compassionate homicide cases mostly does 
 
102. See Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed “Mercy-Killing” 
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 1030–38 (1958) (responding to the publication of GLANVILLE 
WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1957) advocating for the legalization of 
voluntary euthanasia).  
103. Kamisar’s emphasis on voluntary euthanasia’s utilitarian obstacles does not take issue with 
retributivist arguments that might support voluntary euthanasia. See id. at 974 n.21. 
104. For a general discussion of a utilitarian theory of punishment see DRESSLER, supra note 46, 
at 16–17 (utilitarian justifications for punishment hold that the punishment of specific offenders serves 
as a societal instrument aimed at producing beneficial social utility. This consequentialist account calls 
for a calculus that weighs the benefits of punishment against its harms, concluding that punishment is 
justified only when benefits exceed harms, producing future good in terms of crime control). 
105. See Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1013 (1996). 











not produce any social good. Additionally, utilitarian theorists might argue 
that recognizing an excuse not only does not reduce future crime but also 
risks the possibility of an increase in crime, as partially excusing 
compassionate killers might encourage actors to take similar action by 
sending an expressive message to the community that compassionate 
homicide warrants mitigation.106  
Arguably, retributivist theories of punishment might also deny 
mitigation for compassionate killers: given the gravity of the harm inflicted 
on victims, a murder conviction is ostensibly proportional and therefore 
deserved.107 The retributivist position concerning compassionate homicide, 
however, is more nuanced. Part III explains how retributivism may be 
reconciled with exercising mercy towards compassionate killers.108  
Sentencing-based rationales also reject an excuse for compassionate 
homicides, arguing that mitigation of punishment may be accomplished at 
the sentencing phase.109 Federal and state sentencing laws and guidelines 
provide sentencing judges ample discretion to take into consideration the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant.110 The specific offender’s characteristics include personal 
background and other circumstances, especially those directly relevant to 
 
106. There are, however, utilitarian counterarguments to this position. While rejecting the excuse 
rests on an empirical claim that it promotes deterrence, it is not clear whether allowing such defense will 
in fact decrease deterrence. Additionally, utilitarian theorists may weigh in their calculus the harms 
caused to compassionate killers by punishing them as murderers and the harms caused to incompetent 
terminally ill patients if their loved ones will not end their pain and suffering, even when it might be 
beneficial for them. 
107. See Joshua Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections on Excusing Criminal Wrongdoers, 42 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 247, 252–56 (2009). 
108. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the way in which the notion of equitable mercy comports 
with a retributivist theory). 
109. Federal and state sentencing laws require sentencing courts to impose sentences that are 
sufficient but not greater than necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) (2018). The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that while sentencing guidelines provide 
much-needed uniformity, are aimed at reducing unjustified disparities between similarly situated 
defendants and provide evenhandedness and neutrality, sentencing judges must always consider every 
convicted person as an individual and unique case. Courts recognize the tension between the need for 
consistent, uniform sentencing of similarly situated defendants on one hand and the need for 
individualized outcomes that take into account offenders’ specific backgrounds. See Koon v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996). 
110. For relevant circumstances that may be taken into consideration at sentencing see, for 
example, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (Factors to be Considered in Imposing a Sentence: “The court shall 
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in 
paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider—(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant.”). Also, the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual states that mental condition, among 
others, may be relevant at sentencing if present to an unusual degree. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 












the commission of the offense charged.111  While sentencing rules often 
forbid sentencing judges from considering factors such as race or creed, 
factors such as defendants’ mental condition, that are directly relevant to 
defendant’s culpability, might be considered at sentencing.112 Importantly, 
while defendants’ motives for committing the offense largely do not matter 
for defining the level of criminal responsibility itself, they matter at 
sentencing, as sentencing laws allow sentencing judges to consider various 
motives.113  
One argument for maintaining the current legal treatment of 
compassionate homicide is that even assuming that notions of compassion 
and mercy may play a role in the criminal justice system, that role might be 
brought to bear only at sentencing.114 Since sentencing laws allow taking 
into account defendant’s compassionate motive, a plausible argument is that 
exercising mercy ought to be left to sentencing, rather than muddying the 
waters at the trial’s guilt-determination phase.115 Yet, leaving mitigation to 
sentencing is problematic for several reasons; first, murder convictions 
typically trigger mandatory minimum sentences, often life without parole, 
and these provisions do not take into account individuals’ circumstances, 
such as a compassionate motive. 116  Second, taking into account the 
offender’s unique circumstances for committing the homicide is entirely 
discretionary, rather than mandatory. Defendants do not have a right to 
demand that their compassionate motive serve as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing. While some judges would take this fact into consideration, 
others would not, contributing to inconsistent outcomes across the board.117 
Third, sentencing judges may not only refuse to treat compassion as a 
mitigating factor, but may treat it as an aggravating circumstance.118 Judges 
 
111. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER, DOUGLAS A. BERMAN, MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, 
SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 322, 325, 341 (4th ed. 2018) (noting that sentencing schemes generally 
distinguish between immutable characteristics, namely, personal characteristics that are outside of 
defendant’s control and circumstances that are within the defendant’s control). 
112. Id. at 325–26. 
113. Id. at 266. 
114. Regarding the role of mercy at sentencing, some legal scholars reject altogether the idea that 
mercy plays any role within criminal justice, suggesting that justice and mercy are viewed as 
incompatible notions. Yet others hold that a compassionate motive may be taken into consideration at 
the sentencing phase. See infra Part III.B.3.  
115. See Stephen P. Garvey, Tempering Justice with Compassion, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 283, 
290–91 (2018) (suggesting that professor Dressler initially supported exercising mercy only at 
sentencing and not at the guilt determination phase, but had later revised his position given harsh and 
rigid sentencing practices). 
116. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1155–56 (2009) (noting that the 
only exception is death penalty cases). 
117. See People v. Anderson, No. B276741, 2017 WL 3326831, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 
2017); cf. People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶ 13 (stressing that defendant’s circumstances 
were taken into account at sentencing, but ought to be balanced against the severity of her crime). 
118. See People v. Stuart, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 129, 142–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 











may hold that caretakers who kill especially vulnerable family members 
breach a special duty of trust and care they owe them.119 The combined 
effect of an especially vulnerable victim, who is unable to express their 
wishes, with the enhanced duty of care and trust characterizing the 
relationships between a caretaker and a dependent family member, leads 
some sentencing judges to view compassionate homicide as aggravating the 
severity of the homicide.120 Fourth, the upshot of a murder conviction is 
labeling and stigmatizing a compassionate killer as a “murderer,” which is 
problematic given the arguably beneficial motive that triggered the killing. 
Treating compassionate homicide merely as a sentencing issue, rather than 
a matter that touches directly on the scope of criminal responsibility itself, 
does not provide a satisfactory legal framework for addressing these cases.  
Another potential objection is that the existing doctrine of jury 
nullification already offers a legal tool to address the unique circumstances 
of compassionate homicide.121 Jury nullification doctrine empowers juries 
to refuse to apply the law, or nullify its effect, in situations where its strict 
application would lead to an unjust or inequitable result.122 Arguably, this 
doctrine provides a useful tool for juries to avoid the possible unjust 
outcomes in compassionate homicide cases where communities’ 
perceptions about defendant’s culpability are inconsistent with the strict 
treatment of penal codes. Therefore, it is better to leave these controversial 
cases to a case-by-case resolution, where juries might refuse to convict 
defendants with a serious homicide offense if they believe that defendant’s 
culpability is reduced given the compassionate motive. The problem with 
this argument, however, is that the practice of jury nullification mostly 
draws on notions of tolerance rather than on principled doctrine; the law 
 
119. Id. at 143 (observing that “an adult child who takes it upon herself to commit the 
‘mercy killing’ of a very elderly parent based only on that parent’s ‘apparent wishes’ has abused a 
position of trust and committed a very serious crime. A court is not required to conclude such an act 
rests on a higher moral plane than any other killing.”). 
120. See id.; see also People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶ 13. 
121. On jury nullification under Canadian law, and for discussion of a Canadian case specifically 
concerning mercy killing see Benjamin L. Berger, The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal 
Justice Against the Law and the Modern Constitutional Imagination, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 579, 597–98 
(2011) (noting that the criminal justice system expresses ambivalence towards the practice of jury 
nullification, as best captured in the Latimer court’s statement that: “[a]s a matter of logic and principle, 
the law cannot encourage jury nullification. When it occurs, it may be appropriate to acknowledge that 
occurrence.” (quoting R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 68 (Can.))). For further discussion of the 
Latimer case, see supra note 79. 
122. See Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury 
Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 167 (1991) (observing that jury nullification “is a power to 
‘complete’ or ‘perfect’ the law by permitting the jury to exercise that one last touch of mercy where it 
may not be appropriate and just to apply the literal law to the actual facts”); see also David N. Dorfman 
& Chris K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 861, 865 (1995) (noting that instructing jurors on jury nullification would provide a 













grudgingly accepts the practice as inevitable yet falls short of supporting 
it.123  Moreover, jury nullification rests on subjective and elastic juries’ 
beliefs on what is inequitable and unjust rather than offer a coherent 
theoretical basis for mitigation. Commentators often critique the practice as 
lawless, positing that it implements the jury’s own idiosyncratic view of 
justice and morality.124 Furthermore, similarly to the discretionary nature of 
providing mitigation to compassionate killers by sentencing judges, jury 
nullification is also entirely discretionary.125 
Other arguments that reject any recognition of an excusatory basis for 
compassionate homicide rest on moral, ethical and religious rationales.126 
Drawing on arguments such as the sanctity of life and human life as a 
fundamental human right, which are equally applicable for all individuals, 
including terminally ill patients and people with disabilities, some scholars 
strongly oppose any proposals to decriminalize assisted suicide, to mitigate 
criminal liability for voluntary euthanasia, or to recognize an excuse for 
compassionate homicide.127  
2. Practical and Evidentiary Rationales 
Various evidentiary concerns and practical difficulties further support 
the rejection of a doctrinal mitigation for compassionate homicide. It is 
often difficult to identify victims’ genuine wishes regarding whether they 
would have wanted to end their lives, had they been competent and provided 
a choice.128 The cases that this Article targets concern mostly victims who 
are incompetent and therefore lacked the capacity to request to die. It is 
therefore impossible to evaluate whether they would have genuinely wanted 
the actor to kill them, if they had been capable of making their own choices 
about continuing living.  
 
123. See Garvey, supra note 105, at 1043–45. 
124. See Lawrence W. Crispo et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1, 39 (1997).  
125. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1264 (2011) 
(noting that juries have the discretionary power to nullify). 
126. See William Wagner, John Kane & Stephen P. Kallman, Suicide Killing of Human Life as a 
Human Right: The Devolution of Assisted Suicide Law in the United Kingdom, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 
27, 43–50 (2011) (critiquing Britain’s assisted suicide policy and parliamentary proposals). 
127. See id. A counterargument to the “sanctity of life” argument is that the proposed excuse does 
not advocate providing full justification to the compassionate killer, but instead only a partial excuse. 
Recognizing a partial excuse is not inconsistent with the sanctity of life argument and the fundamental 
right to live. 
128. See Teresa Harvey Paredes, Comment, The Killing Words? How the New Quality-of-Life 
Ethic Affects People with Severe Disabilities, 46 SMU L. REV. 805, 828 (1992). Much scholarship was 
written in response to the Canadian case of Robert Latimer, R. v. Latimer, 1995 CanLII 3993 (Can. Sask. 
C.A.). See, e.g., Kent Roach, Crime and Punishment in the Latimer Case, 64 SASK. L. REV. 469 (2001); 
Kent Roach, Reforming and Resisting Criminal Law: Criminal Justice and the Tragically Hip, 40 MAN. 
L.J., no. 3, 2017, at 1, 15–17.  











Additional concerns rest on slippery slope arguments, mostly the claim 
that line-drawing in these cases is an impossible task. Arguably, it is often 
difficult to distinguish between defendants who were genuinely wholly 
motivated by compassion for the suffering victim and those whose 
motivations were mixed. A defendant may be motivated by compassion but 
also by a personal agenda such as financial gain, or by self-compassion, 
such as the desire for relief from the financial, emotional and physical 
burdens of caretaking.129  
Additionally, a powerful argument concerns the unintended 
consequences of recognizing a compassion-based excuse for individuals 
with disabilities.130 People with disabilities and their advocates oppose this 
excuse due to the potential implications of such recognition.131 Providing 
mitigation, they argue, carries a host of negative effects on people with 
disabilities, by contributing to the misguided perception that their lives are 
somehow less valuable and not worth the law’s protection. 132  The 
assumption that severe disabilities diminish people’s quality of life to the 
extent that death is preferable to life is fraught with difficulties.133 Quality 
of life assessments are inherently subjective, as there is no objective way to 
measure and judge another’s pain and suffering.134 Recognizing caretakers’ 
ability to make unsubstantiated assumptions about which lives lack any 
quality is therefore dangerous, opening the door to potential abuses. Such 
assumptions might draw from caretakers’ own biases about people with 
disabilities. In addition, some disability-studies scholars warn that modern 
day eugenics, including euthanasia, shares common features with the Nazis’ 
reliance on eugenics and euthanasia.135 Moreover, since disabled victims are 
often incapable of expressing their own wishes, a defendant’s unilateral act 
of killing arguably takes advantage of their disempowered status, violating 
their dignity and autonomy.136 
 
129. For further discussion of mixed motivations see infra Part III.B.3. 
130. See M. David Lepofsky, The Latimer Case: Murder is Still Murder When the Victim is a 
Child With a Disability, 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 319, 326–30 (2001). 
131. Id. 
132. Id.  
133. See Paredes, supra note 128, at 821–30 . 
134. See John Carroll Byrnes, The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 63 
(1993) (observing that “[c]are must be taken to avoid subjective ‘quality of life’ or financially driven 
decisions”). 
135. See Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do with It Or an 
Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 438 (2011) (noting that the 
Nazis engaged in systemic killings of disabled individuals based on eugenics theories). 
136. While these are serious concerns, their force is significantly diminished, as this Article 
nowhere advocates excusing actors but instead only partially excusing them. Additionally, the thesis 
advanced in this Article focuses on the actor’s motives for the killing rather than on the victim’s 
perspective. Adopting the proposed partial defense therefore diminishes the risk of negative expressive 












Finally, pragmatists might suggest that from a practical standpoint, a 
doctrinal reform is unnecessary, since in practice, compassionate killers are 
already being treated mercifully under existing laws. 137  Adopting a 
compassion-based partial excuse is not needed, the argument continues, 
because compassionate killers are convicted of lesser offenses anyway, 
through both lenient plea agreements, and sentencing judges’ discretion.138 
Moreover, those who are skeptical of the need for a doctrinal overhaul in 
the area would likely suggest that the disparate outcomes in compassionate 
homicide cases demonstrate that decision-makers eventually accomplish 
just outcomes based on the specific circumstances of the cases at hand. 
Arguably, since prosecutors wield enormous discretion to shape the level of 
defendants’ criminal responsibility by offering lenient plea agreement only 
to defendants who they believe warrant mercy, a statutory reform is 
redundant. This Article will revisit these arguments in Part III, while 
elaborating on why adopting a doctrinal basis for mitigation is superior to 
accomplishing similar outcomes through exercising prosecutorial and 
judicial discretion.139 
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON COMPASSION 
In recent decades, psychological studies on various emotions and their 
behavioral impact have significantly developed, with numerous studies 
establishing that emotions have powerful effects in shaping and motivating 
many types of human behavior. 140  While a substantial body of 
psychological studies is devoted to researching familiar emotions like anger, 
fear, disgust, sadness and enjoyment (or happiness), in recent years, 
research on compassion has also gained traction.141  
 
137. I thank Professor Aya Gruber for pointing my attention to this argument. 
138. See People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶ 2 (noting that pursuant to a negotiated 
plea agreement between the parties, the State recommended a sentence of four years’ probation with 
mental health counseling) ; Alridge v. State, No. 11–03–00246–CR, 2004 WL 292062, at *2 (Tex. App. 
Feb. 12, 2004) (the trial judge’s comments to prospective jurors regarding the range of possible sentences 
included the following: “It may be that this particular defendant who was convicted, it was murder, but 
it was a mercy killing. This particular defendant may be up in age and the person that he was convicted 
of murdering was his wife who was very ill at the time and suffering very badly. We could go through 
numerous scenarios that go across the broad range of circumstances in a murder case, but the point that 
I’m—I want to make and I want to stress is that you have to keep an open mind and consider the full 
range of punishment.” (emphasis in original)); see also Gonzales v. State, No. 01-99-00642-CR, 2000 
WL 233141, at *4 (Tex. App. Mar. 2, 2000) (during voir dire hypotheticals, the judge told the “venire 
panel that an ‘abused spouse case’ or a ‘mercy killing’ are the types of cases that merit probation or a 
minimal sentence.”). 
139. See infra Part III.C.2. 
140. See Lerner et al., supra note 24, at 816.  
141. See RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 287–88 (1991). 











One notable feature that emerges from these psychological studies is that 
compassion is a unique emotion.142 While generally, many psychological 
studies on emotions such as anger and fear mostly agree on many of their 
common characteristics, compassion is a more complex notion. 
Psychological literature reveals that there is little agreement among emotion 
researchers on compassion’s defining features, including whether it is a 
distinct emotion or synonymous with other emotions, and even whether it 
is an emotion at all or rather a hybrid affective state.143 Before delving into 
the particular features characterizing compassion, it is essential to clarify 
some theoretical points underlying this notion.  
A. What is Compassion: Definitional Questions 
While emotion researchers often disagree on the precise definition of 
compassion, they identify several theoretical accounts that explain this 
notion. Some researchers describe compassion as a vicarious emotion, 
consisting of an experience of another’s distress, and thus as synonymous 
with empathic distress.144 The implication of this account is that the state of 
compassion is associated with the same expressive behavior and underlying 
appraisals of the state it is mirroring, like distress, pain, sadness, or fear.145 
Another theoretical account perceives compassion not as an independent 
affective state but instead as a variant of sadness, love, or their blend.146 Its 
implication is that compassion shares the core appraisals, properties of 
experiences and display of behavior of sadness, love, or both.147 A third 
theoretical account, which is especially dominant in recent psychological 
literature, considers compassion as either a separate emotion, or a distinct 
affective state with unique features that differ from those of other 
 
142. See infra Part II.A. 
143. Most emotions researchers agree that there are six basic emotions, which include happiness, 
fear, surprise, anger, distress, and disgust. See LAZARUS, supra note 141, at 79. They also agree that 
there are a range of responses to experiencing these various emotions. For example, anger may 
simmer/brood, suppress, and culminate in using physical force to harm someone else. See id. at 59. 
Ekman’s studies compare and contrast familial compassion with these familiar other emotions, for the 
purpose determining whether compassion is an emotion or a distinct phenomenon. See Paul Ekman, 
Paul Ekman’s Taxonomy of Compassion, GREATER GOOD MAG. (June 21, 2010), https://greatergood.ber 
keley.edu/article/item/paul_ekmans_taxonomy_of_compassion [https://perma.cc/F4PJ-5B65]. Others 
define emotions more broadly to also include joy, grief, fear, anger, hatred, pity or compassion, envy, 
jealousy, hope, guilt, gratitude, disgust, and love. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 21, at 276. 
144. See Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 353; Martin L. Hoffman, Is Altruism Part of Human 
Nature?, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 128–29 (1981). 
145. See Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 353. 
146. See id.; Phillip Shaver, Judith Schwartz, Donald Kirson & Cary O’Connor, Emotion 
Knowledge: Further Exploration of a Prototype Approach, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061, 
1065–70 (1987).  












emotions.148 This account is strongly supported by an evolutionary-based 
analysis that assumes that emotions are adaptations to survival and 
reproduction-related situations.149  
Additionally, most emotion researchers distinguish between empathy, 
sympathy, and compassion.150 While some researchers define empathy as a 
family of responses to another that are other-focused and include feelings 
of sympathy and concern for unfortunate individuals,151 others refer to it as 
the vicarious experience of another’s emotions.152 Also, researchers define 
sympathy as “an emotional reaction that is based on the apprehension of 
another’s emotional state or condition that involves feelings of concern and 
sorrow for the other person.”153 Moreover, there is disagreement among 
researchers on whether compassion is distinct from pity. 154  While 
researchers mostly agree that compassion is distinguished from empathy, 
sympathy, and pity, they disagree on whether it is a distinct emotion.155 
Some believe that compassion is neither among the basic five emotions of 
anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and contempt nor is it a mood, but instead, it 
is a hybrid between an emotion and an affective state which is more akin to 
a character trait. 156  Compassion, they explain, once cultivated, is an 
enduring feature of a person, a permanent part of their personality.  
 
148. See id. at 352 tbl.1. 
149. See Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 354–55; see also Randolph M. Nesse & Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth, Evolution, Emotions, and Emotional Disorders, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 129, 131–32 (2009). 
150. See Susan A. Bandes, Compassion and the Rule of Law, 13 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 184, 185 
(2017) (noting that the terms compassion, empathy, sympathy and pity have no fixed meaning, creating 
confusion). 
151. See Mark H. Davis, The Effects of Dispositional Empathy on Emotional Reactions and 
Helping: A Multidimensional Approach, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167, 167–68 (1983). 
152. See Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 351–52. 
153. Id. at 354 (citing multiple sources). 
154. See Martha Nussbaum, Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Winter 
1996, at 27, 27–28. Treating pity and compassion as synonymous terms, Nussbaum identifies three key 
features of compassion: the belief that the suffering is serious rather than trivial, the belief that the 
suffering was not caused primarily by the person’s own culpable actions, and the belief that the pitier’s 
own possibilities are similar to those of the suffered. Id. at 31. Other scholars, however, distinguish 
between pity and compassion, stressing that pity involves condescension on the part of the subject who 
feels in a superior place compared to the object of pity. See LAZARUS, supra note 141, at 287–89 
(distinguishing pity from compassion).  
155. Most emotions researchers agree that there are at least six core emotions, including fear, 
anger, disgust, and sadness. See supra note 143. Professor Paul Ekman believes that there are seven core 
emotions, based on facial expressions, and adds to the list enjoyment and surprise. See Universal 
Emotions, PAUL EKMAN GROUP, https://www.paulekman.com/universal-emotions/ [https://perma.cc/2 
K62-J9JF]. 
156. See EMOTIONAL AWARENESS 139–42 (Paul Ekman ed., 2008) (opining that despite the 
similarities to other emotions, compassion entails some key characteristics that distinguish it from other 
emotions: compassion needs to be cultivated while other emotions do not; compassion, once cultivated, 
is an enduring feature of a person; compassion does not distort the perception of reality; and its focus is 
restricted to the relief of suffering). 











Despite disagreements among emotion researchers on the precise 
definition of compassion, one common account that repeatedly emerges in 
psychological literature defines compassion as the feeling that arises in 
witnessing another’s suffering, motivating a subsequent desire to help.157 
This definition focuses on conceptualizing compassion as an affective state, 
stemming from a subjective feeling rather than as an attitude or a general 
response to others regardless of their suffering.158  
The lack of consensus on whether compassion is best understood as an 
emotion or a hybrid affective state does not carry direct implications for the 
main question that concerns me in this Article, which is whether 
compassion, however defined, may serve as grounds for mitigating murder 
to manslaughter charges when actors kill loved family members to end their 
suffering. 
B. Compassion as Motivating Action 
A distinct tenet of compassion that many researchers agree upon is that 
compassion is a motivational state that drives action.159 Compassion entails 
a proactive reaction, which includes acting towards ameliorating others’ 
suffering, as witnessing it motivates a desire to actively help by engaging in 
specific behavior towards others in need.160 Compassion is therefore not 
merely a feeling or an affective state encompassing a wish to relieve the 
suffering of loved ones, but it also triggers unique responses that are absent 
in other emotional states such as distress and sadness. In contrast with 
empathy and sympathy, which are mostly understood as passive feelings, 
compassion triggers action. 161  Research further shows that compassion 
often motivates individuals to respond to others’ suffering quickly and 
instinctively.162 
Moreover, since compassion is associated with increased concern for the 
other and reduced concern for the actor’s own needs, it motivates not only 
caring behavior but also altruistic behavior.163 A series of studies suggest 
that people who encounter others in a state of distress are often motivated 
 
157. See LAZARUS, supra note 141, at 289 (noting that “[i]n compassion, the emotion is felt and 
shaped in the person feeling it not by whatever the other person is believed to be feeling, but by feeling 
personal distress at the suffering of another and wanting to ameliorate it. The core relational theme for 
compassion, therefore, is being moved by another’s suffering and wanting to help.” (emphasis omitted)).  
158. See Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 351–52.  
159. See id. at 354. 
160. See id. at 352.  
161. See Bandes, supra note 150, at 185–86. 
162. See Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 361–62.  












to address their needs and enhance their welfare.164 These studies confirm 
that compassion overwhelms selfish concerns, promoting altruistic 
behavior.165 Research further establishes that compassion motivates harm-
reducing actions, even at a cost to actors themselves, as it is perceived as 
the “‘guardian’ of the moral domain of harm and undeserved suffering.”166  
Conceding that compassion might motivate action also calls for 
recognizing that sometimes people act out of several motivations after 
simultaneously experiencing the combined effect of more than one 
emotion.167 Emotion researchers have long observed that emotions do not 
operate in a mutually exclusive way and that individuals are often affected 
by a cluster of emotions.168 While the state of compassion may be the key 
motive driving actors to kill, additional emotions, such as despair, 
hopelessness, and powerlessness, act in concert and may also explain 
compassionate homicide.169  
C. Familial Compassion and Caregiving Relationships 
A substantial contribution to understanding the operation of compassion 
in the context of caretaking relationship between close family members is 
found in the work of leading emotions researcher Professor Paul Ekman.170 
Ekman’s taxonomy of compassion identifies a sub-type that is particularly 
relevant to this Article, namely familial compassion.171 Ekman coined the 
term to delineate “the seed of compassion,” planted through close familial 
bonds and consisting of the desire and motivation to alleviate the suffering 
of close family members, such as parents and children. 172  Familial 
compassion, posits Ekman, is brought about in the moment when the actor 
 
164. See Dacher Keltner, The Compassionate Instinct, in THE COMPASSIONATE INSTINCT: THE 
SCIENCE OF HUMAN GOODNESS 8, 12–13 (Dacher Keltner et al. eds., 2010) (describing studies 
conducted by researcher Daniel Batson). 
165. Id. at 13. 
166. See Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 366. 
167. See LAW COMMISSION, PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER, 2004, at 53 (UK), http://www.lawc 
om.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc290_Partial_Defences_to_Murder.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V3N-LCF 
R] (citing the British Royal College of Psychiatrists, Response to Consultation Paper No. 173, for the 
proposition that anger and fear are not distinct emotions). This finding, among others, led the authors to 
recommend that British law also recognize fear as triggering provocation defense. 
Relatedly, people may be motivated both by compassion as well as by selfish motives. See infra 
Part III.B.3. 
168. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get Off So Easy?: The Roles of Imagination and 
Social Norms in Excusing Human Weakness, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 466 (2009). 
169. See Heather Keating & Jo Bridgeman, Compassionate Killings: The Case for a Partial 
Defence, 75 MOD. L. REV. 697 (2012). 
170. See EMOTIONAL AWARENESS, supra note 156, at 139–225. Many of Ekman’s writings on 
compassion draw on insights from ancient Tibetian philosophy and are co-authored with the Dalai Lama.  
171. See Ekman, supra note 143 (distinguishing between various forms of compassion, including 
global compassion, sentient compassion, heroic compassion, and familial compassion).  
172. Id. 











sees a loved family member’s suffering, or given the possibility that they 
would suffer in the future.173 When compassion is activated, he continues, 
the actor’s attention is solely focused on what is relevant to reduce that 
suffering.174  
Moreover, while Ekman holds that compassion is not a separate emotion, 
he argues that it shares some important features with core emotions.175 
Similar to other emotions, he posits, compassion is an automatic, quick, 
unconscious response that happens without any deliberation. 176  When 
compassion is activated, continues Ekman, just like other emotions such as 
anger and fear, it is often inescapable, happens very fast, and is an automatic 
appraisal.177 In some instances, the experiential and physiological aspects of 
compassion motivate actors to immediately respond to loved ones’ 
suffering.178  
D. Compassion’s Effect on Moral Judgment and Reasoning 
Psychological research demonstrates how compassion shapes moral 
judgment and reasoning.179 Ample studies show that various emotions have 
a potent and pervasive effect on individuals’ cognitive thought processes, 
 
173. See EMOTIONAL AWARENESS, supra note 156, at 139–225. 
174. Id.  
175. See Dalai Lama Center for Peace and Education, Paul Ekman - Darwin, the Dalai Lama and 
the Nature of Compassion, YOUTUBE (Dec. 24, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPJvbf6aOy 
Q (stressing compassion, similarly to emotions is unbidden, involuntary, immediate, and fast and that it 
is constructive in nature, as it is intended to help a loved one rather than be harmful and destructive). 
Scholars from other disciplines, mostly philosophers, also agree with Ekman on this point, stressing that 
distinct aspect of compassion. While the emotions of anger and fear mostly carry negative connotations, 
compassion mostly carries positive overtones as it is generally perceived not only as a normal and 
welcome emotional state, but also as an important part of good and virtuous human life, and constitutive 
of excellence of character. See Duff, supra note 18, at 194 (discussing the general idea that emotions are 
understood as an important part of good human life). The foundational roots of virtue ethics moral theory 
are traced to the Greek philosopher Aristotle and were further developed in the works of contemporary 
philosophers, most notably Martha Nussbaum. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: 
THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 33–34 (2011); Taslitz, supra note 168, at 447 (citing MARTHA 
C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 48–52 (2004)). Legal 
scholars have examined how virtue ethics may inform better understandings of criminal responsibility. 
See Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1423–25 (1995).  
176. See Dalai Lama Center for Peace and Education, supra note 175. 
177. See EMOTIONAL AWARENESS , supra note 156, at 38, 142 (observing that the compassionate 
response is an involuntary desire to help relieve suffering); see also Paul Ekman & Daniel Cordaro, 
What Is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic, 3 EMOTION REV. 364, 365 (2011) (enumerating several 
characteristics that are common to all emotions, including automatic responses). Regardless of whether 
familial compassion is a true emotion or rather an affective state that is a hybrid between an emotion 
and a trait, there is a consensus that whenever it is triggered, it is inescapable, happens very quickly, and 
without any deliberation. 
178. See EMOTIONAL AWARENESS, supra note 156, at 142; see also Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 
366 (observing that the experiential facets of compassion motivate the individual to respond quickly and 
appropriately to the suffering of others). 












judgment and decision-making and may constitute powerful drivers of 
action. 180  These studies establish that emotions play a key role in 
understanding motivations for human actions, including harmful ones, like 
taking the lives of others.181  
While most psychological studies exploring the relationship between 
emotions and judgment and decision-making focus on familiar emotions 
like anger and fear, compassion has similar impact on actors’ judgment and 
decision-making. 182  Historically, researchers disagreed on whether 
compassion could be a source of principled moral judgment. 183  While 
earlier thinkers, such as Kant, have argued that compassion was an 
unreliable measure for moral judgments about right and wrong, modern 
emotion researchers have refuted this account, demonstrating that 
compassion figures prominently in moral judgments and in shaping 
action.184  
Contemporary understandings of the role of emotions in actors’ 
judgments and decision-making processes demonstrate a shift in how 
emotions are perceived. While previously, emotions were viewed as 
irrational forces and “enemies of reason,” now they are generally perceived 
as an integral part of cognitive thought processes, as well as reasoned and 
cognitive-based reactions.185 Psychological researchers today mostly reject 
the historic dichotomy between cognition and reason-based decision-
making processes on one hand and emotion-based decision-making on the 
other.186 Instead, various emotions, including compassion, are now largely 
understood as rational and reasonable reactions, affecting decision-making 
processes and shaping actors’ moral judgments.187 Put differently, reason 
and emotion play an integral role in the course of rational decision-making 
 
180. See Lerner et al., supra note 24, at 801–16.  
181. See id. This piece notes that emotion researchers develop models that integrate emotions into 
the decision-making process. For example, the authors propose an alternative model of decision-making 
called Emotion-Imbued Choice Model (EIC). EIC describes the ways in which emotion permeates 
choice processes, and accounts for the newly recognized emotional inputs, integrating them with 
conventional rational choice theories. This model synthesizes emotions into researchers’ previous 
understanding of decision-making first by focusing on the fact that predicated emotions are treated as 
rational inputs in the decision process and are evaluated much like utility, and second, it focuses on 
emotions that are felt at the time of decision-making by considering ways in which these emotions 
influence the evaluations of outcomes. Id. 
182. See Keltner, supra note 164, at 12–13. 
183. See Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 351. 
184. See id. at 366–67. 
185. For an excellent discussion of the shift in psychological and legal perceptions of emotions, 
see Hila Keren, Valuing Emotions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 848–56 (2018). 
186. Id. at 852–56 (citing ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN 192–221 (2005)). 
187. Id. at 853 and accompanying note 174. 











with emotions not only influencing judgments but also being shaped by 
judgments.188  
Under this account, compassion may trigger harm-reducing actions, 
including motivating altruistic actions towards those who suffer, even at a 
cost to the actor.189This happens because experiencing compassion is a 
moral barometer that tracks suffering and other harm-related concerns, 
serving as an intuition that guides attitudes that seek to remedy unjustified 
harm.190  Importantly, research shows that compassion might sometimes 
lead to what Ekman calls “constructive anger,” outbursts of negative 
reactions to injustice or suffering.191 
Furthermore, psychological studies demonstrate that powerful emotions 
may sometimes impair actors’ judgment and decision-making, explaining 
harmful actions. 192  Understanding criminal wrongdoing, including 
homicide, draws on the causal connection between emotional arousal and 
actors’ thoughts and decision-making processes. Compassionate homicide 
might be viewed as an instance where the emotional experience of 
compassion has led an actor to act unreasonably on one particular occasion 
and commit an act of killing.193  
These psychological insights may also carry legal implications for the 
purpose of criminal law theory and doctrine. In what follows, this Article 
draws on insights about the operation of compassion to develop the 
theoretical and moral basis for recognizing a compassion-based excuse.  
III. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE EXCUSE 
The discussion below considers the legal implications of the 
psychological findings discussed above, including the normative 
ramifications for articulating the conceptual basis for a compassion-based 
excuse. To do that, it evaluates whether from the criminal law’s perspective, 
including public policy considerations, recognizing a compassion-based 
excuse is warranted. 
A. Psychological Research’s Implications for the Law  
Psychology researchers’ enthusiasm for studying emotions as one aspect 
of individuals’ rational agency as well as providing reasons for certain 
 
188. Id. at 853–54. 
189. See Goetz et al., supra note 23, at 366. 
190. See id. 
191. Daniel Goleman, Hot to Help, in THE COMPASSIONATE INSTINCT: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN 
GOODNESS 171, 173–74 (Dacher Keltner et al. eds., 2010). 
192. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 269 (2001) 
(observing that emotions may result in destructive behavior). 












actions has in turn influenced legal scholarship. In recent years, 
commentators became interested in exploring the relationship between law 
and the emotions.194 Initially, in line with early psychological research, the 
law similarly assumed that there was no place for emotions in law as the 
latter rests on rationality, whereas emotions were perceived as irrational.195 
But after psychological research into emotions’ role in judgment and 
decision-making significantly developed, legal scholars also began 
pondering whether there ought to be a role for emotions in the law.196 
During the first stage of research in this field, scholars explored how law 
and emotions may be reconciled, explaining that emotions are rational and 
cognitive responses.197 Next, law and emotions scholars delved into specific 
emotions, such as vengeance and remorse, as they are manifested in 
particular legal fields, and considered the ways they operate in various 
contexts including the criminal law. 198  The third stage in this line of 
research, which continues to develop, consists of an inquiry into the 
normative consequences of recognizing the interrelations of emotions and 
law, namely, what should the law do with knowledge gained about 
emotions’ cognitive effects. 199  The main implication of this inquiry 
concerns using psychological understandings to improve legal doctrine and 
reforming the law to produce particular emotional effects by ameliorating 
negative emotions.200  
 
194. The work of several scholars, including Susan Bandes, Terry Maroney, Dan Kahan, Kathryn 
Abrams, and Hila Keren have paved the way for recognition of this new legal field of law and emotions, 
which examines the role that emotions in general and specific emotions in particular, play within the 
law, including among others in the criminal law. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A 
Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006) (elaborating on the 
significance of emotions for the law and explaining that the term “emotions” includes feelings, moods, 
and affect); see also Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,” and the 
Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1401 (noting that emotions are subjective 
psychological states associated with psychological processes); Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s 
Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997 (2010); Susan Bandes, Introduction, in THE 
PASSIONS OF LAW 1 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999). 
195. See Garvey, supra note 105, at 1042–43; see also Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: 
Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 661 n.13 (1989). 
196. Kathryn Abrams, Exploring the Affective Constitution, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 571, 572–
73 (2009). 
197. See Garvey, supra note 105, at 1042–43. 
198. See Abrams, supra note 196, at 573 (discussing the historical developments of law and 
emotions legal scholarship). 
199. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 194, at 2049–50 (describing the third stage of development, 
that they term integration, which is ongoing). 
200. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 319, 
319–22 (2007); see also Keren, supra note 185 (providing a contemporary account of the cognitive 
conception of emotions and their integral part in the law). 











Scholars’ interest in exploring the role that emotions play in shaping 
legal judgments has also reached the realm of criminal law.201 In a seminal 
paper titled Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, professors Dan 
Kahan and Martha Nussbaum identify two disparate approaches to emotions 
that are at work in criminal law doctrines, known as the mechanistic and 
evaluative conceptions of emotion.202 The mechanistic conception holds 
that emotions are impulses that lead to action without embodying beliefs.203 
Moreover, since under a mechanistic account, emotions do not contain or 
respond to thought, this view is skeptical about the coherence of morally 
assessing emotions. 204  In contrast, the evaluative conception views 
emotions as embodying beliefs and expressing cognitive appraisals of the 
significance of events, and they can be morally evaluated for 
appropriateness or inappropriateness. 205  The evaluative conception also 
focuses on actors’ motives and on moral appraisals of their actions as 
relevant to determining the grade of the homicide.206 Kahan and Nussbaum 
further argue that an evaluative conception of emotion not only better 
explains the role of emotions in criminal law, but is also more just and 
superior to a mechanistic one because the doctrines structured to reflect the 
evaluative view better promote the purposes of criminal law.207  
While Kahan and Nussbaum’s work applies the evaluative conception of 
emotions to several criminal law doctrines, including provocation, self-
defense, duress, and insanity, they do not specifically examine the 
implications of this conception in the realm of compassionate homicide.208 
Moreover, while their work touches on the general role for mercy in 
criminal law, it does so only in the context of sentencing, rather than the 
guilt-determination phase of the trial. 209  They stress, however, that 
evaluating defendants’ actions, including the emotional motivations for 
committing them, is done at the trial’s guilt-determination phase.210  
 
201. I have also engaged in this emerging field in previous work by considering the implications 
that psychological research on the emotions of fear and anger might have for the purpose of 
reconstructing the scope of the provocation defense. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 64; see also 
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Loss of Self-Control, Dual-Process Theories, and Provocation, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1815 (2020). 
202. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 21, at 273. 
203. Id. at 277–78. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 273–74, 278 (explaining that their descriptive account demonstrates that changes in 
social norms over the years have also resulted in changes in the content of the law’s evaluations and the 
law’s appraisal of emotions).  
206. Id. at 323–27. 
207. Id. at 274, 350–58. 
208. Id. at 305, 327–50. 
209. Id. at 367–69. 












Commentators have yet to consider the role that compassion might play 
in shaping the scope of criminal responsibility in homicide offenses. The 
argument I develop below draws on Kahan and Nussbaum’s account of the 
evaluative conception of emotions, similarly rejecting the mechanistic view. 
In doing so, I consider how insights gained from psychological research on 
compassion may contribute to legal evaluations and inform the criminal 
law’s understanding of compassionate homicide.  
Various emotions play a critical role in actors’ judgment and decision-
making, which has implications for the scope of criminal excuses and 
suggests that compassion might also play a role in grounding a criminal 
excuse. 
The compassionate feeling, encompassing the motivation to end the 
suffering of a close family member, may sometimes impair individuals’ 
judgment and decision-making. Therefore, similarly to the way that other 
emotions provide reasons for action, compassion may also motivate action, 
including in some instances, triggering a killing.  
Psychological studies on compassion, however, are merely the first step 
in developing the theoretical and moral basis for a compassion-based 
excuse. Legal scholars’ shift towards a consensus that statutory schemes and 
policy choices ought to be supported in reputable empirical evidence rather 
than on mere moral intuitions is a laudable direction. Embracing this 
welcome trend, however, also requires legal scholars to cast doubt on the 
extent to which the law relies on empirical findings, by conceding the 
inherent limits in such reliance.211 Empirical evidence, standing alone, is 
unable to provide the necessary normative basis underlying the adoption of 
a legal overhaul, including recognizing a compassion-based excuse.  
An additional vital component of recognizing a new criminal excuse 
requires identifying the normative dimensions that warrant the adoption of 
such excuse, as drawn from criminal law theory itself. In other words, in 
order for the criminal law to embrace a new excuse, it is not enough that 
psychological studies support it. To justify mitigation of an actor’s criminal 
liability, an evaluative conception of the emotion of compassion ought to 
demonstrate that the moral blameworthiness of compassionate actors is 
reduced, given their motivation for committing the killing. A normative 
evaluation of an actor’s motive to end the suffering of a close family 
member considers the appropriateness of the emotional state of compassion, 
explaining why the act is worthy of mitigation. Therefore, in addition to 
drawing on psychological studies on compassion, a compassion-based 
excuse must be further supported in arguments that are grounded in criminal 
 
211. See generally Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
227, 232–33 (2018) (noting the limitation of empirical evidence in the area of family law). 











law theory itself, as well as in normative and moral considerations, which 
the sections below consider.  
B. The Legal Basis for Reducing Culpability 
Developing the theoretical framework that supports a compassion-based 
excuse calls for identifying the moral basis underlying mitigation. In 
general, two separate legal constructs might allow mitigating murder 
charges to a lesser form of homicide. The first is crafting a separate offense 
titled compassionate homicide, in which the compassionate motive would 
be incorporated into an element of the crime and the prosecution would have 
to prove its elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 212  The second is 
developing an affirmative defense, placing the burden of proof on 
defendants, that would enable murder defendants to raise as a partial excuse 
if they were motivated to kill by compassion. In developing the argument 
below, this Article focuses on the latter legal framework, because it is 
consistent with the structure, reasoning, and rationales underlying existing 
criminal excuses such as duress, provocation, and imperfect self-defense.213 
In advocating the recognition of a compassion-based excuse, I mostly draw 
on the works of professors Joshua Dressler and R.A. Duff, whose writings 
in this area have been instrumental.214  
1. Compassionate Homicide as Lack of Fair Opportunity 
Professor Dressler has long developed a general theory of excuses, which 
he refers to synonymously as the personhood principle or choice theory.215 
Dressler posits that there are certain conditions under which actors’ choice 
to commit crime is not free, and therefore it is not blameworthy (or less 
blameworthy) and may be excused, partially or completely. 216  The 
personhood principle identifies two general excusing conditions, which in 
turn support the recognition of two generic excuses; the first is grounded on 
the notion of lack of capacity (or at least substantial capacity) to conform 
conduct to the requirements of the law, and the second rests on the notion 
of lack of fair opportunity to conform conduct to the law’s requirement.217 
 
212. A proposal for revising homicide offenses, which included a separate offense of “mercy 
killing” was considered in England, in the 1976 Criminal Law Revision Committee, but was eventually 
dropped from their final report due to lack of support. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 147. 
213. See Duff, supra note 18, at 207–09. 
214. See DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 55, at 697–717 (considering the adoption of a new 
criminal excuse for euthanasia); Duff, supra note 18.  
215. See generally Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New 
Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 689, 701 (1988).  
216. See Dressler, supra note 107, at 253. 












The insanity defense is the paradigm example of an excuse that rests on lack 
of capacity, whereas the excuse of duress exemplifies lack of fair 
opportunity.218 Actors may be excused because their choice to commit the 
crime, under the untenable circumstances they were facing, reflects 
society’s legitimate expectations of moral strength.219 
The generic excuse of lack of sufficient opportunity, however, has not 
been applied by Dressler, or any other commentator, in the specific context 
of compassionate homicide. The proposal below, advocating the 
recognition of a new partial excuse grounded in a compassionate motive, 
applies Dressler’s framework of lack of fair opportunity to the realm of 
compassionate homicide. Under the account I develop here, partially 
excusing compassionate killers is not grounded on the idea of lack of mental 
capacity to conform to the law. More specifically, a compassion-based 
excuse is not based on the notion that compassionate killers had lost the 
capacity for exercising self-control over their behavior.220 Instead, it rests 
on the position that these actors lacked a fair opportunity to conform to the 
criminal law’s requirements because the dire circumstances they were 
facing given their family members’ medical condition placed them in an 
untenable situation in which they felt that ending their lives was the morally 
appropriate action.  
2. Reasonable Emotion Motivating Unreasonable Action 
Professor R.A. Duff’s writings on the place of compassion as a basis for 
mitigation of actors’ criminal responsibility lays out the groundwork for 
recognizing a compassion-based excuse for homicide.221 In a paper titled 
Criminal Responsibility and the Emotions: If Fear and Anger Can 
Exculpate, Why Not Compassion?, Duff answers that it can. Similarly to 
recognizing fear and anger as grounding the excuses of duress and 
 
218. See id. 
219. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for 
its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (1989).  
220. I partially draw on Professor Stephen Morse’s writings to support the idea that a generic 
excuse of partial responsibility could be adopted for compassionate homicide. See Stephen J. Morse, 
Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003). Morse rejects 
the concept of loss of self-control to describe cases in which actors’ rational thinking was impaired. Id. 
at 295. Instead, he suggests that criminal law recognize a generic excuse of partial responsibility that is 
grounded in the notion of diminished rationality. Id. at 299–300. While I agree with Morse that the 
notion of loss of self-control ought to be rejected as a basis for an excuse, I disagree with his conclusion 
that the notion of diminished rationality should be used. Instead, I support the notion of impairment in 
judgment and decision-making, but reject the idea that actors who were impacted by emotions acted 
“irrationally.” Like other law and emotions scholars, the position I advocate here is that emotions in 
general, and compassion in particular, are rational and reasonable emotions, rather than examples of 
diminished rationality. It should be noted, however, that Morse has not applied his generic excuse of 
diminished rationality in the context of compassionate killing.  
221. See Duff, supra note 18, at 207–13. 











provocation, he suggests that compassion should also be recognized as 
grounding an excuse for assisting suicides.222  
Duff begins his analysis by considering the roles for anger and fear in 
grounding the excuses of provocation and duress, then applies similar 
reasoning and rationales to the case of compassion as a basis for an excuse. 
Drawing on an Aristotelian view of the emotions, Duff posits that emotions 
are an integral part of individuals’ rational agency, providing reasons for 
action.223 When emotions motivate actions, continues Duff, one should not 
only ask whether the emotion was rational, reasonable, and justified, but 
also whether it was appropriately expressed in the specific action taken, 
because a reasonable emotion can motivate an unreasonable and unjustified 
action.224 Duff further stresses that reasonable and justified emotions are 
inherently liable to destabilize actors’ rationality.225 The critical distinction 
between reasonable emotion and reasonable action stands at the core of 
Duff’s account of the excuses of duress and provocation.226 Both defenses 
require a two-step inquiry; first, whether the emotion—fear or anger—felt 
by the actor was justified, second, whether the reaction to this justified 
emotion was properly expressed.227 
Following the same exculpatory logic that explains the role of fear and 
anger in grounding the defenses of duress and provocation, Duff suggests 
next that a similar double-inquiry ought to apply when considering 
compassion. 228  It first asks whether compassion was a reasonable and 
justifiable manifestation of emotion given the actors’ circumstances. 229 
Second, it asks whether that reasonable and justified compassion also 
reasonably and justifiably motivated the specific criminal reaction taken.230 
Duff continues to list the circumstances underlying the exculpatory 
conditions for a compassion-based excuse. First, the emotion of compassion 
is a reasonable feeling when an actor faces the suffering of a loved one.231 
Second, the reasonable compassionate feeling should properly motivate an 
action of helping to relieve the person’s suffering.232  Third, even if the 
reaction taken is in itself wrong, it is not unreasonable to be tempted to 
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224. Id.  
225. Id.  
226. Id. at 194. 
227. See id. at 194–207. 
228. Id. at 207–13. 















commit this wrong. 233  Fourth, the compassionate feeling is capable of 
interfering with the actor’s judgment and decision-making, resulting in an 
unreasonable act of giving in to the temptation. 234  Recognizing a 
compassion-based defense concedes that the actor’s criminal act, although 
unjustified, was rationally attractive, a temptation by which it was not 
unreasonable to be drawn, namely, a good reason but not sufficiently good 
reason to act.235 Duff concludes that applying these conditions to actors who 
assisted suicide of family members supports recognizing a compassion-
based excuse.236 
Duff’s work provides two important insights into whether criminal law 
theory ought to recognize a compassion-based excuse for homicide. First, 
he suggests that like anger and fear, compassion should also bear on 
criminal responsibility itself, rather than be relegated to the realm of 
sentencing. Second, he crafts the important distinction between reasonable 
emotion and unreasonable action. 
Yet, Duff’s powerful account addresses only compassion’s role as 
grounding a partial excuse for assisting suicide, rather than for murder, 
which is the focus of my argument here. 237  Importantly, Duff remains 
agnostic about whether a compassion-based excuse ought to be expanded to 
also cover homicide cases.238 Since assisted suicide and murder are entirely 
different crimes, evincing disparate levels of moral blameworthiness, 
expanding Duff’s thesis to murder cases remains underdeveloped both in 
his own work, as well as in other commentators’ writings.239 Duff further 
acknowledges that he does not elaborate on the form that the general defense 
of motivation by reasonable compassion might take, including its doctrinal 
elements and its scope.240 Additionally, Duff’s work focuses on criminal 
law theory inquiries as well as on the normative dimensions underlying a 
compassion-based excuse. But his account does not draw on any 
psychological studies demonstrating how compassion might motivate lethal 
action. In sum, Duff’s proposal to recognize the excusatory effect of 
compassion stops short of expanding it to homicide crimes. The remainder 
of this Article aims to pick up Duff’s argument where he left off by 
developing a compassion-based excuse that would allow mitigating murder 
charges to manslaughter.  
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3. A Compassion-Based Excuse for Homicide  
Advocating the recognition of a compassion-based partial excuse for 
homicide rests on the assumption that it is warranted from a moral and 
theoretical perspective. But before further developing this argument, it is 
important to concede a few preliminary assumptions that underpin the 
conceptual framework articulated below.  
First, recognizing a compassion-based partial excuse is mostly justified 
under a retributive account, as it is harder to justify on utilitarian grounds.241 
A retributive-justice justification for punishment (commonly referred to as 
“just deserts”) determines the amount of punishment according to the 
actor’s personal blameworthiness. 242  In doing so, this theory takes into 
consideration not only the seriousness of the offense but also situational 
factors that affect an actor’s culpability. 243  Broadly speaking, criminal 
excuses are better understood from a retributive justice rather than from a 
utilitarian perspective.244  
Yet, while a compassion-based excuse is mostly justified on retributivist 
grounds, the nature of the caregiving relationship between compassionate 
actors and their terminally ill or severely disabled family members adds a 
utilitarian argument supporting mitigation. It explains why compassionate 
killers cannot be regarded as dangerous, neither to specific individuals nor 
to society at large. Compassion-motivated homicide is a limited reaction, 
which is targeted only to one specific individual—that is, the caretaker’s 
close family member. 245  The unique circumstances underlying 
compassionate actors’ killing make their wrongdoing one-time tragedies 
that are highly unlikely to reoccur. The lengths of their punishments should 
therefore be reduced to reflect this reality. 
The unique circumstances underlying the targeted response of an actor 
who killed a loved family member out of compassion arguably does not 
justify a punishment that is grounded in specific deterrence considerations. 
But general deterrence concerns remain, suggesting that, broadly speaking, 
it is more difficult to underpin a compassion-based excuse in a utilitarian 
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argument. Thus, the moral basis for such defense is predominantly grounded 
in retributivism.246 
Retributive justice theories further stress the notions of proportionality 
and even-handed justice. 247  The proportionality principle holds that the 
severity of punishment should depend on a combination of the harmfulness 
of the criminal conduct and the actor’s culpability.248 It forbids the infliction 
of a greater amount of punishment than what the offender deserves, thus 
limiting the scope of criminal liability.249  In the case of compassionate 
homicide, the degree of moral blameworthiness is reduced, therefore 
supporting the reduction of criminal responsibility as well. Inflicting on the 
compassionate killer the same amount of punishment as the punishment 
inflicted on an offender who was motivated to kill by a nefarious motive 
would be disproportional. The discussion below proceeds from the 
assumption that a compassion-based excuse may mostly be justified under 
a retributive-justice framework.  
Second, the compassion-based defense advocated here rests on the 
premise that it is a partial excuse, rather than a justification or a full excuse. 
The assumption underlying such partial excuse is that while compassionate 
killers experience a reasonable and justifiable emotion, the action that the 
emotion motivates—the killing of an innocent victim—is unreasonable and 
thus cannot be justified, even partially.250 Yet conceding that the action is 
unjustified does not mean that it cannot be partially excused.  
Third, and related to the point about reasons for action, recognizing a 
compassion-based defense adopts the position that contrary to popular 
belief, actors’ motives for killing do matter for the purpose of determining 
 
246. While some retributivist theorists reject any role for exercising mercy towards criminal 
defendants, arguing that it interferes with the demands of justice, others support the exercise of what 
they call “equitable mercy,” arguing that it complements rather than contradicts justice. When legal rules 
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provide zones of discretion that allow decision-makers to take into account the relevant particularities 
of a case and treat offenders more leniently than what the formal rules prescribe. See generally R. A. 
Duff, The Intrusion of Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361 (2007); see also Heidi M. Hurd, The Morality 
of Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 389, 390 (2007); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 
1444–45 (2004). 
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249. See generally Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions 
of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1835 (2007) (discussing the connection between proportionality and 
retributivism). 
250. The view that compassionate homicide ought to be only partially excused rather than fully 
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necessary to avoid a greater harm, for example, in situations where death was imminent and the victim’s 
pain was excruciating. See Duff, supra note 18, at 218–19.  











the scope of their criminal liability. As noted earlier, conventional wisdom 
holds that motives do not make any difference in terms of delineating the 
level of actors’ criminal responsibility.251 Yet, the relevance of motives for 
criminal liability is far more nuanced. Despite what seems like a rigid 
rejection of the idea that motives do not matter for the guilt determination 
phase of the trial, commentators recognize that this is an inaccurate 
statement, as there are several contexts in which nefarious motives do 
matter.252 The paradigm example is hate crimes, where defendants’ racist or 
otherwise biased or bigoted motive increases the level of their criminal 
liability.253  
Compassionate homicide presents the opposite question, that is, whether 
a benign or ostensibly beneficial motive may serve to mitigate the severity 
of the homicide. Several commentators have answered the question in the 
positive, suggesting that the degree of the actor’s blameworthiness varies 
based on what motivated the criminal act. 254 Some commentators note that 
recently legislatures have begun to seriously contemplate the role of motive 
in compassionate killing and its implications for criminal statutes.255 Others 
observe that courts may judicially create new excuses which are based on 
benign motivations, noting that unlawful mercy killing of a loved family 
member is not justified but merely excused—courts might exculpate a killer 
whose motive was not evil.256 Yet, courts cannot recognize a defense raised 
by a hospital worker who killed an unrelated terminally ill patient, because 
a justificatory defense (unlike an excuse) usurps legislative prerogative.257  
Still others posit that contrary to the conventional wisdom that taking 
motives into consideration interferes with the rule of law, there are certain 
cases in which motives may advance the rule of law.258 Comparing and 
 
251. See supra Part I.B. 
252. See Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2006, at 81, 90, 92 (noting that “criminal law is one of the few areas . . . in which 
motive matters,” and that “motives for committing even a single criminal act can vary dramatically, with 
implications for the principal goals of criminal law: deterrence, retribution, isolation, and 
rehabilitation”). 
253. See Elaine M. Chiu, The Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
653, 668–69 (2005). 
254. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 21, at 315 (“[A]n undesirable act can be carried out for 
a variety of reasons and is more or less worthy of condemnation depending on what the actor’s motives 
for doing that act express.”); see also Ferzan, supra note 48, at 90 n.37.  
255. See Chiu, supra note 253, at 675 (referring to these as euthanasia cases); Husak, supra note 
90, at 474 (discussing the different treatment of an actor who killed out of benevolent motive such as in 
the case of mercy killing and one who killed out of a selfish motive). 
256. See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the 
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 743–47; Whitley R. P. Kaufman, Motive, 
Intention, and Morality in the Criminal Law, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 317, 331–33 (2003).  
257. See Gardner, supra note 256, at 744–45. 
258. See Shachar Eldar & Elkana Laist, The Irrelevance of Motive and the Rule of Law, 20 NEW 












contrasting mercy killing and mercenary killing for financial gain, the 
argument continues, demonstrates that different motives carry different 
moral significance; therefore a law that neglects to afford significance to 
this difference may be rightly criticized.259 The partial excuse advocated 
here rests on the premise that from a normative perspective, motives matter 
for the purpose of morally evaluating the level of actors’ blameworthiness 
and in turn for determining the scope of their criminal responsibility. 
Specifically, a compassion-based excuse draws on the idea that actors’ 
beneficial motive diminishes the scope of their criminal liability.  
Moving forward from these assumptions and concessions leads to this 
Article’s key thesis that recognizing a new partial excuse for homicide that 
is grounded in the notion of compassion is warranted from the perspective 
of criminal law theory. The discussion below suggests that actors may 
experience objectively reasonable compassion, which might lead them to 
commit an unreasonable act of killing. This distinction between a 
reasonable emotion and an unreasonable action as underlying the proposed 
compassion-based excuse draws an analogy to similar rationales underlying 
existing defenses of provocation and imperfect self-defense. 
Developing a compassion-based excuse builds on integrating the 
research findings of psychological studies on compassion discussed above 
with a moral evaluation of the compassionate state, demonstrating that the 
actor’s moral blameworthiness is reduced. Since diminished 
blameworthiness is directly relevant to the scope of substantive criminal 
responsibility, a compassionate motivation warrants recognition of an 
affirmative defense, rather than treatment as a mitigating circumstance at 
sentencing. 
In advocating for a compassion-based excuse, I draw on Professor Duff’s 
argument, under which experiencing reasonable compassion may 
nonetheless result in committing an unreasonable act of killing a close 
family member to end their suffering. 260  Experiencing compassion is a 
reasonable and rational emotional state, even if the reaction to it is 
unreasonable and excessive. This position acknowledges that while the 
killing itself might be unreasonable per se, it is not unreasonable to be 
tempted to act as the actor did, given the compassionate feeling to help a 
close family member. This view concedes that even reasonable people may 
act unreasonably on one particular occasion, when they are motivated by a 
compassionate desire to end the suffering of loved ones.  
 
259. See Hessick, supra note 47, at 113–14 (noting that the theory of expressivism supports an 
expanded role for motive in punishment and the paradigmatic example of mercy killing is best explained 
by expressivism. The mercy killer is willing to disrespect the value of life only to end another person’s 
suffering as opposed to pecuniary gain.). 
260. See Duff, supra note 18, at 208–211. 











Conceding that compassionate homicide is unreasonable and unjustified 
does not mean that it is not an understandable reaction.261 Understanding 
this reaction rests on acknowledging that the reasonably felt powerful 
emotion of compassion may sometimes impair actors’ judgment and 
decision-making.262 While compassionate killing is an unjustified wrong, 
allowing consideration of a partial excuse that would mitigate murder to 
manslaughter acknowledges that it is not unreasonable for compassionate 
actors to be tempted to commit the act.263 Giving in to the temptation to end 
the suffering of a close family member by killing them cannot be justified, 
but it can be viewed as an understandable human reaction. This is so because 
in these cases, judgment and decision-making processes are excessively 
shaped by feelings of compassion, accompanied by despair, hopelessness 
and powerlessness.  
Furthermore, the idea that compassionate homicide may be perceived as 
an understandable reaction draws an analogy to the provocation defense. In 
advocating an alternative view of provocation, professor Victoria Nourse 
has developed the notion of “warranted excuse,” that recognizes 
circumstances in which the provoked killer’s emotional reaction is 
somewhat understandable—even if not justified or completely excused—
given the wrongdoing perpetrated by the deceased.264 A similar reasoning 
equally applies in the context of compassionate homicide. Here, normative 
arguments support the position that the actor ought to be partially excused 
because given the reasonableness of the emotional experience, their reaction 
may be understandable. 
Comparing and contrasting a compassion-based excuse with the 
provocation defense is also useful because the former is likely to be subject 
to less critique than the latter. The provocation defense has been extensively 
 
261. See, e.g., Elise J. Percy, Joseph L. Hoffmann & Steven J. Sherman, “Sticky Metaphors” and 
the Persistence of the Traditional Voluntary Manslaughter Doctrine, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 383, 392 
(2011) (observing that the provocation doctrine is based on the idea that the provoked actor’s behavior 
was at least understandable even if not excusable). For further elaboration of the idea of understandable 
reaction in the context of the provocation defense, see the discussion below of Victoria Nourse, 
Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1393, 
1396–97 (1997) (suggesting that when provoked defendants take the law into their own hands and 
respond with rage shared by the law, society “understands” defendant’s emotions and their reaction). 
Such understanding of defendant’s emotions does not justify the act itself, but may provide the basis for 
a warranted excuse. When the defendant’s outrage is based on acts that the law would independently 
punish as wrongful acts, the defendant is placed in a position of normative equality vis-à-vis the victim 
and may raise the partial excuse of provocation. Id.  
262. See Duff, supra note 18, at 205 (noting that emotions, when strongly felt, are apt to 
destabilize practical reason). 
263. Id. at 193–94 (opining that a reasonable emotion can motivate action that is unreasonable or 
unjustifiable). 
264. See Nourse, supra note 261, at 1337–38 (suggesting that the provocation defense should be 
limited to cases in which defendants’ emotional judgment are understandable from their belief that the 












criticized on various grounds, not least its arguably harmful implications for 
female victims of intimate-partner violence.265 Commentators lament that 
male defendants who killed their departing female intimate partners may 
claim that the latter’s behavior provoked the killing.266 Elaborating on the 
feminist critique of the provocation doctrine exceeds the scope of this 
Article, but for purposes of the argument here, suffice it to say that one of 
the reasons why provocation is viewed as problematic is that it embodies a 
judgment of victim’s fault as partially contributing to the killing. 267  In 
contrast, a compassion-based excuse avoids the pitfalls of implying blame 
on victims. 268  While the victim’s dire medical conditions provide the 
reasonable explanation for the unreasonable—yet understandable—act of 
killing, recognizing a compassion-based excuse nowhere hinges on the 
problematic notion of imputing blame on victims, as it is solely defendant-
centered. Furthermore, there is an even stronger case for recognizing a 
compassion-based excuse than provocation; the motivation for the 
compassionate killing is other-regarding, focusing on the actor’s belief 
about the best interests of the close family member, whereas provocation is 
a self-regarding reaction.269  
Additionally, the idea that an actor may act unreasonably yet still deserve 
partial mitigation also underlies self-defense statutes, as many jurisdictions 
recognize imperfect self-defense.270 The doctrine of imperfect self-defense 
may apply where a fearful actor subjectively but unreasonably believed that 
the use of deadly force was necessary, resulting in a manslaughter rather 
 
265. See Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2015). 
266. See Nourse, supra note 261, at 1332 (observing that reform of the provocation defense has 
permits juries to return a manslaughter verdict in cases where the defendant claims passion because the 
victim left); see also id. at 1392 (noting that the departing wife’s killer cannot claim that leaving merits 
outrage). 
267. See Nourse, supra note 261, at 1338. 
268. One possible counterargument is that recognizing a partial excuse might send an expressive 
message to society that the lives of severely disabled and terminally ill patients are less deserving of the 
law’s protection. This concern, however, may be mitigated by stressing that the proposed defense only 
offers a partial excuse, rather than complete acquittal. Recognizing the defense does not rest on a 
justificatory basis, that holds that the act of killing itself was justified. Instead, it is based on partially 
excusing the actor in light of understanding their emotional reaction. See also supra note 136 for 
additional responses to the above concern. 
269. See Thomas Morawetz, Empathy and Judgment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 517, 521 (1996) 
(book review) (noting that anger is self-regarding and compassion is other-regarding). 
270. See DRESSLER, supra note 46, at 222–23. In Pennsylvania, for example, voluntary 
manslaughter consists not only of traditional anger-based provocation but also of unreasonable belief in 
the need to use self-defense, even if the belief was mistaken and the elements of self-defense cannot be 
met (imperfect self-defense). See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2503(b) (2020) (“A person who intentionally or 
knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes 
the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the killing under Chapter 5 of this title 
(relating to general principles of justification), but his belief is unreasonable.”). 











than murder conviction.271 Drawing an analogy to imperfect self-defense 
doctrine supports the suggestion that an unreasonable yet understandable 
act of compassionate killing may also warrant reduction of murder charges 
to manslaughter. Just like an actor who overreacted to intense fear by 
unreasonably killing another, the compassionate killer acts unreasonably as 
a result of an overreaction to an overwhelming compassionate feeling.272 
Similarly, the compassionate actor cannot be fully acquitted of homicide yet 
deserves to be convicted of a lesser crime, as well as avoid the collateral 
consequences and moral stigma associated with being labeled a murderer.273 
Taken together, juxtaposition of compassionate homicide with killings 
motivated by anger or fear demonstrates that recognizing a compassion-
based defense is entirely consistent with the reasoning and rationales 
underlying other emotion-based defenses that the criminal law already 
recognizes, such as provocation, duress, and imperfect self-defense.274 In all 
of these emotion-motivated killings, actors’ emotions were reasonable yet 
their reactions were excessive and unreasonable, albeit understandable.  
In sum, the above arguments establish that the basis for partially 
excusing compassionate killers rests on acknowledging that experiencing 
compassion reduces the level of actors’ moral blameworthiness and 
therefore should also reduce their criminal culpability.  
 
271. See Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 597, 589 
n.17 (2004) (book review) (“While anger is the most common emotional basis for the partial defense of 
provocation, fear of serious bodily harm or death is the emotion that justifies the complete defense of 
self-defense.”); see also People v. Blacksher, 259 P.3d 370, 421 (Cal. 2011); State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 
429, 439–40 (Md. 2004). 
272. See, e.g., People v. Sotelo-Urena, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 278–79 (Ct. App. 2016) (reversing 
defendant’s conviction of murder by holding that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the 
defendant, a homeless man, who arguably could have overreacted to fear, might have successfully raised 
an imperfect self-defense claim); State v. Marr, 765 A.2d 645, 648 (Md. 2001) (recognizing imperfect 
or partial self-defense when the defendant’s actual, subjective belief was that he was 
in apparent imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from the assailant, requiring the use of 
deadly force, but that belief was not objectively reasonable). 
273. Imperfect self-defense excuse may also support an alternative basis for compassion-based 
excuse, one that rests on a theory of “imperfect necessity.” Under this account, partial mitigation might 
be considered where defendant subjectively believed in the necessity of killing, however, objectively, 
the killing was unnecessary, making the defendant’s belief a mistaken one. In this project, I do not further 
develop the notion of imperfect or incomplete necessity excuse, because the use of necessity as a defense 
is rarely successful, and the analogy to the provocation defense is stronger. 
274. While criminal law doctrines already recognize other emotion-based excuses, such 
recognition is in itself controversial, and there are scholarly debates concerning whether the law ought 
to recognize them. The scholarly debates are especially lively in the context of the provocation defense. 
For an excellent discussion of the scholarly critique, including the feminist critique of the provocation 












C. Additional Normative Arguments Supporting the Excuse  
As the previous section demonstrates, recognizing a partial excuse for 
compassionate homicide rests on rationales and reasoning grounded in 
criminal law theory itself. Mitigation is normatively warranted and is 
constructed by considerations that the criminal law normally relies upon, 
predominantly hinging on the idea of reduced moral blameworthiness. The 
below policy considerations further support the position that criminal law 
ought to recognize a partial excuse that is grounded in compassion.  
1. The Emotional Toll of Caregiving  
The unique nature of familial caring and caretaking relationship between 
compassionate killers and their victims play a critical role in making a case 
for a compassion-based excuse. Intensive caregiving entails a degree of 
selflessness, as compassion is closely associated with altruism. 275 
Importantly, intense familial caretaking responsibilities takes a heavy 
emotional toll on caregivers. Yet, the law is reluctant to recognize the 
critical role of caretaking and its host of emotional, physical and financial 
implications for those who are sole providers of long-term caregiving.276 
Explaining why compassionate killers’ reactions may be viewed as 
understandable from a normative perspective draws on acknowledging the 
physical and emotional tolls that intensive caretaking exact on caregivers. 
These experiences may in turn affect caretakers’ judgement and decision 
making, sometimes leading to lethal action. 
Compassionate homicide cases exemplify how the law not only fails to 
take into consideration caregiving relationships and particularly familial 
caretaking, but also disregards the emotional toll they take, and the 
psychological, physical and financial strains brought on by around-the-
clock care. Commentators note that one common theme characterizing 
compassionate homicide is the intensive nature of care provided by actors 
to their children, parents, and spouses, and the deep feeling of isolation that 
caretakers feel given the inadequate or limited care by others including 
 
275. See Hurd, supra note 246, at 415–20 (noting that mercy plays a crucial role in the area of 
intimate relationships) Hurd argues that mercy is a salient example of what she calls quasi-superogatory 
actions within intimate relationships. When one person loves another or is a friend of another person, 
continues Hurd, such relationship sometimes demands that this person supererogate because love and 
friendship necessitate supererogation. Id. The term supererogation is a term of art used in ethics 
scholarship to refer to acts that are morally good although not strictly required. See David Heyd, 
Supererogation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2019 
ed. 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/supererogation/ [https://perma.cc/J4CF-
K28Q]. 
276. See Jacqueline Fox, Caring and the Law, 35 J. LEGAL MED. 337 (2014) (book review). 











caring agencies.277 Moreover, they continue, the timing of compassionate 
homicide is often causally linked to withdrawal of support or refusal of care, 
and to compassionate killers’ fear that their loved ones might receive 
negligent or inadequate care if they were unable to provide care 
themselves.278  
Additionally, the long-lasting nature of caretaking also explains the 
cumulative impact that various emotions, including compassion, have on 
caregivers. Psychological researchers observe that experiencing a host of 
powerful emotions over extended periods of time may carry cumulative 
effect, as these emotions increasingly simmer until they culminate in a 
breaking point.279 Yet the law often fails to recognize the impact of the 
cumulative nature of emotions, by insisting on doctrinal elements that are 
inconsistent with this experience.280  
Moreover, caretaking relationships carry broader societal ramifications 
than these personal implications. The duty of caring for sick and disabled 
family members is unequally distributed, falling for the most part on close 
family members.281 The government forces private actors into these intense 
caregiving relationships because it does not offer adequate public 
caregiving alternatives for the sick, disabled, and elderly.282 Arguably, when 
the government exerts its coercive power and punishes individuals who 
killed because they overreacted to compassion, the lack of publicly 
supported alternatives should at least be taken into account as a basis for 
reducing the level of criminal liability.283  
2. Substituting Consistency and Uniformity for Discretion 
Another normative argument supporting the recognition of a 
compassion-based partial excuse rests with the need to provide consistent 
and uniform outcomes to similarly situated defendants. Part I has identified 
a gap between doctrine and practice, noting that while despite the absence 
 
277. See Keating & Bridgeman, supra note 169, at 715–16; see also Heather Keating & Jo 
Bridgeman, Intensive Caring Responsibilities and Crimes of Compassion?, in REGULATING FAMILY 
RESPONSIBILITIES 253 (Jo Bridgeman, Heather Keating & Craig Lind eds., 2011). 
278. See Keating & Bridgeman, supra note 169, at 716.  
279. See NORMAN J. FINKEL & W. GERROD PARROTT, EMOTIONS AND CULPABILITY: HOW THE 
LAW IS AT ODDS WITH PSYCHOLOGY, JURORS, AND ITSELF 131–36 (2006). 
280. Id. at 95–97 (using an example from the context of the provocation defense, the typical 
requirement that a provoking incident be sudden and that no time has lapsed between it and the killing). 
See also supra Part III.B.3 for cumulative provocation. 
281. Cf. Courtney G. Joslin, Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 153, 159–63 (2015) (discussing the duty of support that family members owe one another and the 
reduced role for the state). 
282. Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, 
and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 19–20 (2000). 












of a doctrinal basis for reducing murder charges to lesser offenses, 
compassionate killers are sometimes, but not always, treated leniently by 
decision-makers, as prosecutors and judges exercise their discretion to 
provide mercy. 284  Yet, a critical feature of this form of mercy is that 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion are inherently discretionary. Its 
exercise is therefore unpredictable, inconsistent, and often results in lack of 
uniformity across the board.285 
Recognizing a statutory doctrinal basis for mitigating compassionate 
killers’ criminal responsibility is preferable to relying on prosecutors 
offering lenient plea agreements precisely because of the highly 
discretionary nature of this practice. Commentators have long critiqued the 
enormous discretion that prosecutors exercise in shaping the criminal justice 
system in general, beyond the specific context of compassionate homicide, 
noting that prosecutors wield unconstrained, unchecked, and unreviewable 
discretion in selecting not only what cases to prosecute but also what 
charges to bring.286 Commentators further lament that prosecutors serve as 
de facto adjudicators in most criminal cases because over ninety-five 
percent of cases are resolved in plea agreements rather than in trials.287 
Voluminous writings have been devoted to the pitfalls of prosecutorial 
discretion;288 elaborating on the shortcomings of such tremendous exercise 
of discretion in the administration of criminal justice, as well as on the risks 
and intended consequences embedded in this practice, exceeds the scope of 
this Article. For purposes of my argument here, it is worth stressing that this 
discretion results in lack of consistency and uniformity, with similarly 
situated defendants treated differently without a coherent doctrinal basis. 289  
Similarly, the practice of judges exercising mercy at sentencing is subject 
to the same shortcomings characterizing prosecutorial discretion given the 
discretionary nature of sentencing.290 Importantly, the question of whether 
 
284. See supra Part I.C.  
285. See infra notes 286–291 and accompanying text. 
286. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 506–07 (2001); Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1503, 1509–10 (2007).  
287. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009). 
288. See id. at 871–73; see also Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, 
and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and 
Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409 (2003); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation 
Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009).  
289. See, e.g., John Seewer & Thomas J. Sheeran, Ohio Hospital Shooting: Mercy Killing or 
Murder, NBC NEWS, (Aug. 12, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/48638867/ns/health-healt 
h_care/t/ohio-hospital-shooting-mercy-killing-or-murder/#.Xu0N52hKjIU [https://perma.cc/A84G-VB 
BA]. 
290. People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶ 21 (noting that the trial court considered the 
State’s recommendation of probation and reviewed both the factors in mitigation and aggravation and 
thus had not abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to a prison term of four years). 











providing mitigation for compassionate homicide is normatively warranted 
is inherently a public policy choice that rests on value-laden judgments. As 
such, it ought to be made by legislatures, who are authorized to make ex 
ante rules that promote their constituencies’ public policy preferences, 
rather than judges, who exercise their discretion ex post to accomplish 
justice in individual cases.291  
Consistency and uniformity are crucial values in the criminal justice 
system in general,292 and in compassionate homicide in particular. They 
ameliorate the problematic effects of decision-makers’ exercise of 
discretion in deciding which defendants deserve to be treated more leniently 
and which do not. Adopting a compassion-based excuse might also offset 
decision-makers’ implicit biases, such as gender-based biases, that often 
characterize the exercise of discretion.293 It ensures that a compassionate 
motive towards a victim is consistently treated by the criminal justice 
system as a mitigating circumstance that might reduce the grading of the 
homicide.  
Furthermore, recognizing a compassion-based partial excuse may also 
counterbalance the harsh effects of the current over-punitive criminal justice 
system with its stringent sentencing schemes and policies and their 
unintended consequences.294 Under current laws, actors who killed their 
terminally ill or severely disabled family member out of compassion may 
be convicted of the crime of murder.295 Importantly, murder convictions 
carry mandatory minimum sentences, which are typically life sentences, 
thus depriving judges the opportunity to exercise any discretion at 
 
291. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 77, 69 N.E.3d 834, 857 (stressing that 
public policy determinations properly belong to the legislatures and that judges should not usurp the 
authority to decide them); see also Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally 
Tailoring Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 431 (2013).  
292. See generally Mona Lynch, Expanding the Empirical Picture of Federal Sentencing: An 
Invitation, 23 FED. SENT’G REP., 313, 313 (2011) (noting that sentencing guidelines were “meant to 
minimize irrationality and uncontrolled discretion in the system, and presumably would result in 
consistency and uniformity in sentencing”). 
293. See supra Part I.B–C (comparing the Liltz and Forrest cases). 
294. Voluminous writings are devoted to criticizing the criminal justice system, both at the federal 
as well as at the state level, and its numerous unintended consequences including the disparate effects 
on minorities. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012); see also PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 
2–15, 17, 61–66 (2017). Further elaborating on the broader implications of the overly punitive criminal 
justice system exceeds the scope of the argument I make in this Article. Instead, advocating the 
recognition of a new excuse is a necessary part of a much larger reform of the criminal justice system, 
because of its specific implications for compassionate killers. 
295. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, No. A139389, 2015 WL 7012997, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 
2015) (characterizing the homicide as “mercy killing” but observing that the law does not excuse such 
killing); People v. Anderson, No. B276741, 2017 WL 3326831, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2017) 












sentencing by mitigating defendant’s punishment. 296  Legislatively 
amending existing statutes to include a compassion-based excuse would 
allow judges to impose lighter sentences, and therefore contribute to a more 
just and less punitive criminal justice system. 
Furthermore, the absence of consistency is particularly salient when 
considering the role that various emotions play in underpinning different 
criminal defenses. Scholars note that the law treats emotions in conflicting 
ways and does not provide a uniform answer to the question of how 
emotions affect culpability, including in its treatment of doctrines like 
provocation, duress, and imperfect self-defense.297 
Yet, uniformity, consistency, and predictability are especially pertinent 
values in the context of compassionate homicide, because a compassionate 
motivation might cut both ways, sometimes serving as a mitigating factor, 
but other times as an aggravating one. While some prosecutors and judges 
may believe that actors’ compassionate motives ought to result in 
diminished criminal responsibility, other decision-makers view this motive 
as a factor in aggravation, due to the unique vulnerability of terminally ill 
or severely disabled victims and the special position of trust and duty of care 
that caretakers owe their family members, which the killing breaches.298  
Adopting a compassion-based excuse is likely to result in less reliance 
on exercising prosecutorial and judicial discretion to accomplish a more 
lenient treatment of compassionate killers. The excuse provides a principled 
doctrinal basis that allows a defendant to request that the judge instruct the 
jury on this defense. Granted, exercising discretion is an integral and 
inescapable component of prosecutorial and judicial authority.299 Rather 
than suggesting that the criminal justice system ought to do away with 
discretion altogether, the more modest claim that this Article makes is that 
when possible, it is preferable to diminish the extent to which it is exercised. 
It is better to rely on a statutory, doctrinal reform to accomplish goals like 
consistency and predictability, rather than leave enormous amount of 
discretion in the hands of institutional actors. 
 
296. See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241, 1246–47 
(2011). 
297. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 21, at 270–73 (noting that the law treats emotions in 
conflicting ways). 
298. See People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶ 13. The trial court considered both 
mitigating factors, including the unique circumstances that led to the killing. Id. The court also 
considered factors in aggravation, including the fact that the victim was physically handicapped, and 
that the defendant was a family member in a position of trust. Id. It was within the judge’s discretionary 
power to decide how to weigh these factors. Compassionate motive was a factor in aggravation because 
the defendant, as a primary caretaker, owed a special duty of care and trust to her disabled daughter. Id.; 
see also supra Part I.D.1.  
299. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of 
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1422–23 (2008). 











In addition, amending criminal codes to legislatively recognize a 
compassion-based excuse makes a difference not only for curbing 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion but also for structuring juries’ decision-
making process. While the vast majority of criminal trials resolve in plea 
agreements, where juries do not play any role, 300  if a compassionate 
homicide case goes to trial, the existence of a compassion-based excuse 
might change its outcome. Since existing laws do not recognize any 
doctrinal basis for reducing the grade of the homicide to a lesser offense, 
juries currently do not have a legal hook to hang a manslaughter conviction 
on. A legislative overhaul adopting a compassion-based excuse would 
provide juries with such necessary hook. Jurors, however, would remain 
free to reject the partial excuse, retaining their discretion to make factual 
findings based on the specific circumstances of the case. Rather than 
entitling defendants to mitigation, the excuse merely adds an additional tool 
to the juries’ toolbox, one that not only helps structure and guide their 
discretion but also one that they are free to use or decline.301  
IV. THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE DEFENSE  
Having identified the partial excuse’s theoretical basis, the discussion 
below draws on these principles to consider its doctrinal implications. First, 
the premise underlying the recognition of a compassion-based excuse is that 
it would be an affirmative defense, namely, one that the defendant would 
have to prove by preponderance of the evidence.302 Next, the question is 
what elements an actor would have to satisfy in order to successfully raise 
a compassion-based excuse. Answering this question requires carefully 
crafting the scope of a compassion-based excuse by elaborating on the 
circumstances and conditions under which it may or may not apply and 
delineating its precise elements.  
One clarification is in order before proceeding further. Legislatively 
adopting a compassion-based excuse suggests neither that mitigation is 
necessarily warranted in a particular case nor that the defense ought to be 
available to every defendant claiming to have killed a family member out 
of compassion for the victim. Put differently, adopting the proposed excuse 
does not mean that the jury would always be instructed on the defense every 
 
300. See Stuntz, supra note 286, at 528, 536–37. 
301. See, e.g., White v. State, 699 S.E.2d 291, 296 (Ga. 2010) (observing that the issue of 
justification is for the jury to decide, and the jury is free to reject a defendant’s claim that he acted in 
self-defense); see also Tom Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 
1022 (2001) (observing a trend in the law toward broadening juries’ discretion to decide which 
circumstances amount to adequate provocation). 
302. This position is consistent with the treatment of comparable emotion-based excuses such as 
provocation, duress, and self-defense. On affirmative defenses, see generally DRESSLER, supra note 46, 












time a defendant raises the claim. The judge will remain free to refuse to 
instruct the jury on the elements of the defense if it is clear that they cannot 
be established, similarly to other excuses such as provocation, self-defense 
and duress.303 Since instructing the jury remains within the sole province of 
judges, a court may refuse to instruct the jury on a defense if there is 
insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support it.304  
Conceding that there might be circumstances where raising the defense 
would be appropriate but others where it would not, calls for formulating 
limits on the availability of the defense to ensure that it is successfully raised 
only in suitable cases. Arguably, some readers may agree with the proposed 
theoretical basis undergirding the excuse, yet disagree on its doctrinal 
implications and precise elements. It is thus necessary to consider the 
circumstances under which the defense would be excluded in order to 
prevent excessive reliance on it as well as slippery slope and abuse concerns. 
One controversial question is whether the availability of a compassion-
based excuse ought to be tethered to the severity of victims’ medical 
conditions, hinging on the specific types of illnesses and disabilities that 
they suffer from. Put another way, should the defense depend on whether 
the victim’s death from the illness was imminent anyway, regardless of the 
actor’s intervention? Arguably, the relatively easier cases concern victims 
who suffered from terminal illnesses, in which it was clear that their death 
was impending even without the actor’s intervention. The most 
controversial circumstances, however, concern killings of severely disabled 
individuals, like Courtney Liltz, whose death was not imminent yet whose 
condition necessitated intensive caretaking.305  
It is neither my goal here to define in advance what medical conditions 
are appropriate for considering the compassion-based mitigation nor to 
implicitly suggest that some lives are not worth living. Instead, I suggest 
that victims’ precise medical conditions that trigger compassionate killing 
should not be incorporated into an element of the defense. It is impossible 
to identify in advance predefined categories of medical conditions that 
might trigger compassionate killing. Rather than enumerating a rigid list of 
medical circumstances and conditions that might lead an actor to kill out of 
compassion, the question of when accepting the defense’s theory might be 
appropriate should be left to the jury to decide on a case by case 
 
303. See, e.g., United States v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. 
Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621–22 (4th Cir. 1994). 
304. See supra note 303. 
305. See People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶¶ 6–8.  











determination after being properly instructed by the judge on the excuse’s 
doctrinal elements.306  
The subsections below elaborate on the proposed elements that judges 
ought to consider when determining whether to instruct the jury on a 
compassion-based excuse. These narrowly defined elements provide some 
critical legal constraints on the availability of the defense.  
A. An Objective Component: Reasonable Emotional Experience 
An important doctrinal constraint to limit the availability of the proposed 
excuse concerns including an objective prong as an element of the defense, 
in addition to a subjective prong. The subjective element of the proposed 
defense would require the defendant to establish, by preponderance of the 
evidence, that they were motivated to kill a close family member wholly out 
of compassion for the victim. Put differently, the actor experienced a 
compassionate feeling, triggering them to end the suffering of a loved one. 
Yet, an additional objective element is necessary here. It must be based on 
the reasonableness of the compassionate feeling, measured against the 
standard of an ordinary person, in similar circumstances. 
Courts and scholars note an important distinction between the notions of 
emotion reasonableness and act reasonableness in the context of the 
provocation defense.307 In general, an act reasonableness inquiry requires 
assessing the reasonableness of defendant’s act of killing by asking whether 
a reasonable person in defendant’s shoes would have similarly killed.308 
Emotion reasonableness, on the other hand, requires evaluating whether 
defendant’s emotional experience was reasonable under the circumstances, 
asking whether a reasonable person would be likely to act rashly after 
 
306. This position draws an analogy to the provocation defense and specifically to the objective 
element of the adequacy of the provocation. Today, most jurisdictions have rejected predefined rigid 
categories as amounting to adequate provocation, instead leaving to the jury to determine whether the 
defendant acted in response to being adequately provoked from an objective perspective. See DRESSLER, 
supra note 46, at 503–504. Similarly, the proposed compassion-based excuse would leave juries to 
decide the circumstances in which the defense might be appropriate. Under my proposed compassion-
based excuse, juries would be granted discretion in deciding which circumstances ought to partially 
excuse defendants. Yet, exercising this type of discretion by the jury is an integral component of every 
jury trial, and the case of compassionate homicide is not different from cases where juries’ discretion 
determines whether the defense’s theory would be accepted. The proposed excuse rests on the premise 
that it is preferable that juries would exercise their discretion after being properly instructed by the judge 
on the legal elements of the defense, instead of leaving all discretion at the hands of prosecutors in 
deciding which cases warrant mitigation, without any legislative basis derived from a statutorily pre-
defined defense.  
307. See, e.g., People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1130 (Cal. 2013). 
308. See Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1053 












experiencing the intense emotion.309 The compassionate homicide excuse 
that I propose here is based on such an emotion reasonableness framework. 
Similarly, the objective prong of the compassion-based affirmative 
defense would require the defendant to prove, by preponderance of the 
evidence, that the feeling of compassion that they experienced at the time 
of the killing was a reasonable emotional response and that an average 
person, in similar circumstances, would have also experienced that emotion, 
and might have been tempted to act rashly.310 Put differently, the jury would 
be instructed on the defense if the judge rules that there was sufficient 
evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find by preponderance of the 
evidence, that any average person facing defendant’s circumstances might 
have been similarly tempted to act rashly. 
The objective component is a necessary constraint on the scope of the 
defense because it affords mitigation only to defendants whose behavior is 
judged to represent societal understanding of the predicament the defendant 
was in. This evaluative conception of compassion requires the law to take 
into account defendant’s benign motive, namely, the motivation to help 
relieve a family member of their pain and suffering. 
B. Motivated by Compassion for the Victim 
The subjective element of the proposed defense would require the 
defendant to establish that they were motivated to kill a close family 
member wholly out of compassion for the victim. The defendant would have 
to prove that they subjectively experienced a compassionate feeling, 
triggering them to end the suffering of a loved one. This requirement 
ensures that a compassion-based partial excuse is limited only to 
circumstances in which the actor’s killing was wholly motivated by 
compassion for the victim. This position draws a normative line between 
defendants who deserve mitigation and those that do not. As psychological 
research establishes, the main tenet of compassion is the sole altruistic 
desire to help loved ones.311 
The implication of this requirement is that the excuse ought to be 
excluded from defendants in two types of circumstances; first, defendants 
who killed out of financial motivations, such as the prospect of inheritance 
 
309. See Gruber, supra note 265, at 275 & n.10 (discussing the provocation defense as applied in 
the Beltran case). 
310. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 64, at 1787 (discussing the proposed fear-based 
provocation’s objective prong). 
311. See supra Part II.B–C. 











or the financial relief from hefty medical bills.312 The proposal therefore 
categorically rejects mitigation where financial greed and pecuniary 
advantages motivate the killing. A second type of exclusion concerns 
defendants who were motivated to kill by compassion towards the self, 
rather than the victim: they killed because of the selfish desire to relieve 
themselves from caretaking responsibilities. In these cases, actors’ own 
emotional struggles and limitations, such as the inability to cope with 
caretaking responsibilities and its emotional toll, mostly motivated the 
killing. Indeed, compassionate homicide often implicates complex familial 
relationships, as well as structural entanglements that contribute to the 
decision to kill.313  
The latter basis for excluding the excuse, however, calls for closer 
scrutiny. Reality is far more complicated than a single-dimensional view of 
individuals’ motivations, as people’s reasons for action are often multi-
faceted, combining several cumulative motivations. An actor may kill 
mostly (as opposed to wholly) out of compassion towards the victim, but 
also out of some self-compassion, given the emotional toll that intensive 
caregiving exacts on the caretaker.  
The question whether the proposed excuse should be strictly limited to 
defendants who killed wholly out of compassion towards the victim or rather 
expanded to also cover killings committed mostly out of compassion 
towards the victim is therefore debatable and at this point may be left for 
future consideration of legislatures. 314  For now, suffice it to say that 
conceding that some actors might be motivated by a combination of reasons 
should not necessarily lead to rejecting altogether a compassion-based 
excuse in these circumstances. From a normative perspective, the law might 
also recognize a compassion-based excuse in cases where it was mostly 
compassion for the victim that motivated the killing, albeit intertwined with 
 
312. Arguably, there is room for distinguishing between greed-motivated killing and relief from 
significant financial stress. The single caretaker’s financial costs of caregiving, including difficulties in 
maintaining a paid job, could put their entire family at risk of bankruptcy, poverty, and homelessness. 
This is especially true in our health care system which places the financial burdens of caretaking for the 
sick and the disabled on their family members, mostly women. See Eduardo Porter, Why Aren’t More 
Women Working? They’re Caring for Parents, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2 
019/08/29/business/economy/labor-family-care.html [https://perma.cc/NN2D-H54Y]. The financial 
relief from caretaking costs also include, at least in part, relief from the accompanying stress, anxiety, 
and insecurity. These considerations pertaining to relief from significant financial burden fall under self-
compassion, as opposed to an act that was wholly motivated by compassion for the victim, and could be 
attacked as improper motivations. For that reason, reasonable legislatures may diverge on whether to 
adopt a partial excuse that requires an act that is “wholly” or “mostly” driven by compassion for the 
victim. As noted below, in this Article, I choose to leave this nuanced question open for further debate. 
313. I thank Jamie Abrams and Hila Keren for directing my attention to this point. 
314. My goal in this project is to begin sketching in broad strokes some of the elements of the 
proposed excuse. I do not purport to fully address all the doctrinal implications stemming from 
recognizing such an excuse. I leave for future scholarly work as well as for states’ legislatures the choice 












some self-compassion towards oneself. Arguably, these cases ought to be 
brought before juries, who will ascertain whether it was mostly compassion 
for the victim that motivated the killing and whether the specific defendant 
deserves mitigation. Juries routinely make similar complex factual 
determinations in other contexts as well.315  
C. Close Family Members Following Caretaking Relationships 
Another constraint on the scope of the proposed defense concerns 
limiting its operation only to close family members. Paradigm examples 
include parents, children, siblings, and spouses. The proposed defense 
would be excluded from professional caretakers such as doctors, nurses, or 
other paid caretakers.316 The rationale behind such constraint lies with the 
unique nature of caretaking relationship in the familial context. It recognizes 
the emotional toll that providing intensive caregiving to loved family 
members exacts on caretakers. These relationships are characterized by the 
one-on-one nature of care and the fact that often, a single caretaker bears all 
the responsibility of caregiving for a sick or disabled family member. 
Furthermore, as close family members, these single caretakers are not being 
financially compensated and are often forced to forego paid employment 
opportunities, which puts them at greater financial risks.317  In contrast, 
professional caretakers, like nurses and other third parties, are being paid to 
do the job of caretaking as part of their professional responsibility. 
Moreover, in close familial relationships, the natural assumption is that the 
killing was motivated out of love and genuine compassion, as opposed to 
third parties who might be more likely to act out of other motivations. 
The above limit leaves open the question of who falls under the definition 
of “a close family member.” Arguably, there is room for debate on whether 
the law ought to provide mitigation based only on compassion towards 
victims who are close family members, according to formal tests, namely, 
blood relationship, adoption, and marriage. Notably, these would only 
include parents, children, siblings, and legal spouses.  
But there is a growing societal and legal recognition that the definition 
of “close family members” should not be strictly limited to these formal 
 
315. See generally John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital 
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 2012–13 (2005). 
316. The question of the role of doctors and nurses ought to be left to circumstances involving 
physician-assisted suicides and voluntary euthanasia cases, since it better fits their unique features. As 
explained earlier, the scope of the argument in this paper is limited to non-voluntary euthanasia as 
opposed to voluntary euthanasia. 
317. See Dhruv Khullar, Who Will Care for the Caregivers?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://w 
ww.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/upshot/who-will-care-for-the-caregivers.html [https://perma.cc/W94B-JE 
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definitions. 318  The law recognizes a variety of contexts in which the 
definition of “close family members” is further expanded to also cover 
“functional” family members. 319  These include relationships between 
individuals who are not formally related but their relationships practically 
mimic formal ones.320 
The proposal advocated here supports the recognition of a functional 
definition of individuals who fall under the category of “close family 
members,” rather than adhering to formal tests that limit the scope of the 
defense. For example, such functional definition would recognize live-in 
partners who were not formally married to the victims. Since functionally, 
unmarried cohabitants often act similarly to married couples, expanding the 
reach of the defense to them is normatively warranted. Yet, this expansion 
is sufficiently narrow to exclude killings committed by acquaintances, 
friends, or paid caretakers.  
Several reasons support the outcome of denying mitigation to friends and 
acquaintances claiming to have acted out of compassion for the victim, 
reserving the partial excuse to unique circumstances involving close family 
members or their functional equivalent. As discussed earlier, psychological 
research on compassion devotes separate attention to the compelling force 
of familial compassion.321  The proposed excuse’s separate treatment of 
familial compassion tracks and parallels this line of research. Furthermore, 
unlike close family members, friends and acquaintances mostly do not 
engage in long-term, single caretaking responsibilities for terminally ill or 
severely disabled victims, and therefore their judgement and decision 
making are not similarly impaired. Additionally, limiting the excuse to 
familial compassion is warranted in order to address slippery slope 
concerns, prevent over-expansive applications of the defense, and avoid its 
abuse.322 
 
318. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 245–46 
(2001); see also Marsha Garrison, The Decline of Formal Marriage: Inevitable or Reversible?, 41 FAM. 
L.Q. 491, 493–99, 501–03, 516–19 (2007). 
319. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53–54 (N.Y. 1989); see also United 
States v. Haney, 287 F.3d 1266, 1271–73 (10th Cir. 2002) (duress defense is not limited to familial 
relationships), vacated en banc, 318 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2003). 
320. See generally James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: The 
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 923 (2001). 
321. See supra Part II.C (discussing Paul Ekman’s separate treatment of familial compassion and 
distinguishing it from other forms of compassion). 
322. See Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk?, 
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1998) (addressing the implications of overly expanding the scope of 
criminal excuses, in the context of what had been referred to as “abuse excuses,” where criminal 












D. The Victim Did Not Object to the Killing 
In typical compassionate homicide cases, victims lacked the mental 
capacity to express their wishes due to a severe disability or terminal 
illness.323 Importantly, advocating the recognition of a compassion-based 
excuse rests on the premise that the victim never expressed any objection to 
the killing. This limitation revisits the distinction discussed earlier between 
non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.324 The proposed partial excuse 
advocated here should only apply in cases of non-voluntary rather than 
involuntary euthanasia. An important constraint on the application of the 
excuse would exclude it from a defendant who killed a victim who explicitly 
objected to their death and expressed their wish to continue living despite 
their pain and suffering. The victim’s explicit objection to causing their own 
death is a critical factor that would justify a court’s refusal to instruct the 
jury on the defense. Respect for victims’ right to make their autonomous 
choices, as well as promoting victims’ dignity, make the exclusion of the 
defense from defendants who ignored victims’ wishes normatively 
warranted. 
E. A Single Perpetrator, Excluding Conspiracies to Kill  
Another constraint on the scope of the defense concerns limiting its 
availability only to single actors, as opposed to more than one perpetrator, 
acting together in concert. Consider, for example, a case in which two 
siblings decide together to kill their ailing parent to end her pain and 
suffering.325  Arguably, both siblings might have been motivated to kill 
wholly out of compassion and genuine love for a suffering parent. Yet, 
policy-based reasons support the exclusion of the defense from co-
defendants. First, adopting a partial excuse is warranted, among others, 
based on recognizing the emotional toll that a single caretaker experiences 
when carrying alone the burden of caregiving for a sick or disabled family 
member, without any support from the state or another family member. In 
contrast, when more than a single individual is caregiving for a close family 
 
323. See, for example, a recent case involving eighty-seven-year-old Lilian Park, who was the 
single caretaker of her severely disabled adult grandson and purposely overdosed him. Derrick Bryson 
Taylor, 87-Year-Old Killed Her Disabled Grandson with Overdose, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/us/florida-grandmother-overdose-grandson.html [https:// 
perma.c c/TSA5-6GBX]; see also R. v. Latimer, 1995 CanLII 3993 (Can. Sask. C.A.) (involving a father 
who had killed his severely disabled twelve-year-old daughter out of compassion). 
324. See supra Part I (discussing non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia). 
325. I thank professor Kimberly Robinson for directing my attention to this point. 











member, the responsibilities are shared among them and therefore their 
respective burdens are at least somewhat alleviated.326 
Moreover, when two perpetrators decide together on killing a close 
family member, they commit not only homicide, but also the separate crime 
of a conspiracy to commit murder.327 The nature of the conspiracy, namely, 
an agreement to kill combined with an intent to take a life, significantly 
aggravates the nature of the crime.328  The existence of such conspiracy 
therefore ought to preclude the defense from more than a single actor. 
F. Limited Application: Homicide Offenses  
Considering the adoption of a compassion-based excuse raises the 
question whether the defense ought to be strictly limited to homicide 
offenses or rather expanded to include additional criminal offenses. One can 
easily imagine a host of circumstances in which a defendant might claim 
that they committed various criminal acts out of compassion. Just to name 
one paradigm example, consider the case of a defendant who commits theft 
out of compassion towards the poor, the homeless, and the hungry rather 
than out of financial greed.329  
Generally speaking, incorporating notions such as mercy and 
compassion as a basis for mitigation may appeal to many readers who are 
concerned with the existing harsh and over-punitive criminal justice system 
and its unintended consequences. 330  While this Article does not 
categorically reject the expansion of these notions to additional contexts, 
delving deeply into the specific implications of such expansion exceeds the 
scope of my arguments here and is better left to future work.  
For the purposes of this Article, the compassion-based excuse is limited 
in scope to cover only homicide cases. By comparison, the scope of the 
comparable emotion-based provocation defense is similarly limited to 
homicide.331 One reason that supports applying a compassion-based excuse 
 
326. See How to Share Caregiving Responsibilities with Family Members, NAT’L INST. ON 
AGING, https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/how-share-caregiving-responsibilities-family-members [https:// 
perma.cc/CVE6-PELJ]. 
327. See, e.g., People v. Jessee, 222 Cal. App. 4th 501, 503 (2013) (a jury convicted a woman who 
had killed her husband for financial gain of both murder and conspiracy to commit murder). 
328. The expansive nature of conspiracy liability has long been subject to extensive critique. See, 
e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 413 (1959). 
329. Cf. VICTOR HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES (1862) (The protagonist, Jean Valjean, stole a loaf of 
bread from a baker to feed his poor sister’s hungry children.). 
330. Elaborating on the over-punitive criminal justice system exceeds the scope of this paper, but 
ample literature addresses these problems. See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. 
REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2015).  
331. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 343, 381 n.148 (2007) (noting that the partial defense of provocation is permitted only in 












to homicide cases rests with the pervasive reliance by all jurisdictions on 
mandatory minimum sentences for defendants convicted of murder.332 As 
noted earlier, in these cases, judges cannot exercise much discretion at 
sentencing; once the jury convicts a defendant of murder, a mandatory 
minimum sentence applies.333 In contrast, in most other crimes, mandatory 
minimum sentences do not apply.334 When mandatory sentences are not 
required by law, mitigation may be accomplished through the use of judicial 
discretion at sentencing. Put differently, providing a doctrinal basis for 
mitigating murder charges to manslaughter is especially urgent when the 
application of harsh mandatory minimum sentences is at issue.  
G. A Proposed Model Defense 
As elaborated earlier, this Article proposes that legislatures adopt a 
compassion-based partial excuse, rather than leave mitigation solely to 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion.335 Given the necessity of incorporating 
the above-mentioned limits into the defense’s elements, I outline below a 
model provision that policy makers could readily consider, and would cabin 
the potential applicability of the excuse.  
An Affirmative Defense: Partial Excuse for Compassionate 
Homicide 
An actor may be convicted of manslaughter, if he or she establishes 
by preponderance of the evidence that: 
a. The actor was the sole caretaker of a terminally ill or severely 
disabled close family member, whom the actor killed wholly 
out of compassion, and in killing was solely motivated by the 
desire to end the victim’s pain and suffering; and 
b. Any ordinary person in the actor’s situation, facing similar 
circumstances, would also have experienced the 
compassionate emotion affecting such person’s judgment and 
decision-making, and would have been likely to act rashly. 
 
332. See Caroline Forell, Domestic Homicides: The Continuing Search for Justice, 25 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 22, 29 (2017). 
333. See supra Part III.C.2 (addressing mandatory sentences for murder convictions). 
334. One exception concerns serious drug crimes. See Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines 
at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1614 (2012). 
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H. Applying the Proposal: Testing the Defense’s Limits 
Having sketched the elements of the proposed compassion-based excuse, 
let’s hypothesize whether the defense might have been applicable in the 
Liltz case, discussed in the Introduction.336 Liltz was the sole caretaker of 
her severely disabled daughter Courtney. She subjectively believed that her 
own death from cancer was imminent and that once she died, Courtney 
would not only be unable to receive proper care, but also would be 
extremely miserable. Since Liltz knew that her death was impending, she 
had no monetary motive for the killing such as the prospect of financial gain. 
Moreover, the dire circumstances that Liltz was facing show that her act 
was not motivated by self-compassion. Instead, Liltz’s act was wholly 
motivated by compassion towards Courtney and the sole desire to prevent 
Courtney’s future suffering. It is therefore likely that Liltz would have been 
able to satisfy the subjective prong of the partial excuse, by preponderance 
of the evidence.  
Meeting the excuse’s subjective element is merely the first step in the 
inquiry. Next, Liltz would have to establish, by preponderance of the 
evidence, that any ordinary person in her situation, including their own 
imminent death and being a single caretaker of a severely disabled child, 
would have also experienced a reasonable compassionate feeling towards a 
close family member. Liltz would further have to prove that the judgment 
and decision making of any ordinary person in her circumstances might 
have also been impaired, and that such impairment might have made that 
person prone to act rashly. Put differently, any ordinary person might have 
been tempted to prevent a family member’s suffering, by overreacting, even 
if not necessarily by killing. It is therefore likely that Liltz could have 
established sufficient evidence to prove the excuse’s objective element. In 
sum, applying the proposed excuse to the Liltz case suggests that it is a 
paradigm example where reducing murder charges to manslaughter would 
have been normatively warranted.  
Yet, the mere existence of a compassion-based excuse nowhere compels 
an outcome in which defendant would necessarily prevail on the defense. 
To demonstrate the limited scope of the excuse, let’s test its applicability on 
the facts of another case. The California decision in People v. Anderson is 
illustrative.337 On December 11, 2013, Lance Anderson shot and killed his 
68-year-old wife Maxine, to whom he had been married for 32 years, while 
she was sleeping, then took a taxi to the nursing home where his severely 
disabled sister Lisa was hospitalized and shot and killed her too. 338 
 
336. See supra Introduction. 
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Anderson told police detectives that he had killed them to end their suffering 
and “send them home.” 339  He testified that Maxine had suffered from 
several health problems, which began with breast cancer, and continued to 
severe depression and anxiety. He further testified that the impact of those 
afflictions on Maxine was “brutal to watch,” that she refused to take the 
medications that her doctors prescribed and that she had lost motivation and 
desire and did not want to live that way.340 Anderson also told detectives 
that originally he had planned to shoot Maxine and then commit suicide but 
after shooting Maxine he had decided to also shoot his sister.341 Anderson’s 
severely disabled sister Lisa was a resident of a skilled nursing facility after 
a heart attack six years previous caused her severe brain damage.342 She was 
unable to care for herself and used a feeding tube. Anderson said that “she 
never wanted to be in the bed like that,” and that she had told him that she 
never wanted “to be laying around in my own shit,” but had not signed an 
advanced directive documenting those wishes.343 Both deceased, however, 
had never explicitly asked defendant to actively end their lives.344  
Anderson was charged with two counts of murder under California law 
and waived his right to a jury trial.345 In a bench trial, the trial court rejected 
Anderson’s argument that he was culpable only of voluntary manslaughter 
because he was overcome by passionate feelings of helplessness in the face 
of the victims’ prolonged suffering. The court found Anderson guilty of two 
counts of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to an 
aggregate term of 100 years to life.346 
On appeal, Anderson argued that the trial court applied an incorrect legal 
standard for voluntary manslaughter, and that it should have accepted a 
provocation claim and mitigated the murder charge to voluntary 
manslaughter. 347  He claimed that the killings were the product of an 
emotional response so intense that his reason was obscured so as to negate 
the element of ‘malice’ required to prove a murder charge.348 He further 
argued that for the provocation defense to apply, it was sufficient that he 
 
339. Id. at *1. 
340. Id. at *4. 
341. Id. at *3–5 (Police found a note in the house that read: “Good morning, lover, . . . . Sleep 
well. You will suffer no more. Give everyone my love. I will join you soon enough.”). 
342. Id. at *4. 
343. Id. at *4. 
344. Id. at *2. Jason King, Maxin’s son from a previous relationship, testified that his mother had 
never told him that she could not live with the problems she was having or that she wanted to end her 
life. Id. 
345. Id. at *1. For the California statute governing the Anderson case see CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
346. Anderson, 2017 WL 3326831, at *1.  
347. Id. at *12. In addition, defendant appealed his lengthy sentence, arguing that the trial court 
had failed to accord appropriate weight to his mental state as a mitigating factor. Id. at *15. 
348. Id. at *12. 











was provoked, even if his passive victims did nothing to provoke him.349 To 
support the provocation claim, defense introduced into evidence the 
testimony of a clinical and forensic psychologist.350 The expert testified that 
there was no evidence to support an insanity defense as Anderson knew 
what he was doing and believed that the killings were rational and justified 
acts.351 However, continued the expert, “there was an impairment in his 
ability to reason at that time that . . . undermined his ability to understand 
what he was doing from any perspective other than the one that he was 
rigidly stuck in at that time.”352 The expert further opined that Anderson had 
a limited ability to tolerate the pain and suffering of those he cared most 
about, and that over time, the exposure to that pain and suffering wore him 
down, resulting in a process that drove him to alleviate their suffering, and 
that he came to believe that the only way to do that was to actively end their 
lives.353  
The California court of appeals rejected Anderson’s arguments and 
upheld the two first-degree murder convictions.354 The court held that the 
trial court allowed Anderson to present a provocation claim but then 
rejected it on the facts of the case; while provocation’s subjective 
component was satisfied given the evidence that showed that Anderson was 
overcome by a sense of helplessness, its objective component was not met 
because the sleeping and incapacitated victims could not have provoked 
him. Anderson’s emotional reaction to their suffering was not objectively 
reasonable.355  
The question is whether the outcome might have been different had the 
proposed defense been legislatively adopted in California. Would Anderson 
have been able to prevail on a compassion-based excuse? Applying the 
subjective and objective prongs of the proposed defense demonstrates that 
it is most likely that Anderson would have failed to satisfy, by 
preponderance of the evidence, the requirements of the objective element. 
Anderson would have likely satisfied the subjective element of the 
proposed partial excuse. Arguably, Anderson could have established that 
subjectively he killed his wife and sister wholly out of compassion after 
witnessing their continuous pain and suffering. Several factors, however, 
strongly suggest that Anderson would not have met his burden of 
establishing the objective prong of the excuse. To begin with, Anderson’s 
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350. Id. at *6. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. (alteration in original). 
353. Id. at *7.  
354. Id. at *13–15 (Defendant’s statements to police detectives established that defendant had 
premeditated the killings, by making funeral arrangements and practicing at a shooting range.).  












wife Maxine was neither terminally ill nor severely disabled. Instead, she 
was a cancer patient who suffered from severe depression and anxiety, but 
there was no evidence to suggest that she was terminally ill or that her death 
was imminent. Moreover, while Anderson was the primary caretaker of his 
wife, he was not the primary caretaker of his sister, who was receiving 
medical care at an institution. Under the proposed model statute above, the 
applicability of the partial excuse may vary regarding Anderson’s two 
victims; as for his sister, Anderson would fail to meet even the threshold 
element of being a “single caretaker,” which is embedded in the defense’s 
subjective prong. The analysis might differ with respect to Anderson’s wife, 
as he might satisfy the subjective prong, and the inquiry would turn on 
whether the objective prong has been satisfied. Furthermore, the method of 
the killing strongly counsels against reducing murder charges to 
manslaughter. Anderson had shot both victims following a prolonged and 
detailed planning, including making funeral arrangements.356 
In contrast to the Liltz case, the facts of the Anderson case suggest that 
mitigation of criminal responsibility is not normatively warranted. 
Anderson’s double homicides were mostly motivated by self-compassion, 
rather than wholly motivated by compassion for his wife and sister. 
Anderson’s main motivation for the killings was to relieve himself from the 
physical burden and emotional toll of caretaking responsibilities towards his 
sick and severely disabled family members. A totality of the circumstances 
inquiry would have likely demonstrated that Anderson had not established 
the defense’s objective element. Anderson would have likely failed to prove 
that an ordinary person, facing a similar predicament, would have also been 
likely to act rashly.  
CONCLUSION 
“If I had not killed her, she would have died and that is something I could 
not bear to happen to her.”357  
—Toni Morrison, Beloved 
 
356. Compare id. at *1–2, with People v. Liltz, 2017 IL App (1st) 161996-U, ¶ 8. The proposed 
partial excuse is not limited only to defendants who acted in a spur-of-the-moment manner, without any 
advanced planning or deliberation. The proposal recognizes that many situations involving 
compassionate homicides do entail some level of premeditation and deliberation. Instead, the inquiry 
under the objective prong contains the element of acting “rashly,” requiring juries to assess whether any 
ordinary person in defendant’s situation would have also been likely to act rashly. 
357. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 200 (New American Library 1987) (1987) (The protagonist 
Sethe explains why she chose to kill her baby daughter out of love and mercy, rather than allow her to 
endure the emotional and physical horrors of slavery.). 











Compassionate homicide is a controversial topic, and the proposal to 
recognize a compassion-based excuse is hugely provocative. 358  In 
considering the elements of a compassion-based excuse, special attention 
should be given to the tension between defendants’ claim for equitable 
mercy and the need to vindicate vulnerable victims’ rights by sending an 
expressive message that affirms the wrongfulness of taking lives.  
While this Article does not attempt to resolve all the intricacies 
surrounding the issue, it aims to ignite a scholarly debate that would lead to 
future contributions on the topic. Specifically, it hopes to contribute to the 
growing literature on the role of emotions in shaping behavior. Its goal is to 
better understand the reactions of compassionate killers and explain why 
they might deserve mitigation, without fully excusing them.  
One advantage of recognizing a compassion-based excuse is that it 
confronts the contentious problem of compassionate homicide head-on. It 
offers a transparent basis for addressing the matter rather than disguising its 
complexities by relegating them to the realm of non-transparent and non-
predictable exercises of prosecutorial and judicial discretion. 
Inconsistencies and lack of uniformity are not unique features of 
compassionate homicide, as these are integral aspects of the criminal justice 
system. There are numerous other areas where exercising mercy is arguably 
warranted. While recognizing compassion-based excuse is merely one 
aspect of offering compassion towards defendants in a harsh, unforgiving 
and overly punitive system of criminal justice, compassionate homicide 
illuminates a paradigm example in which exercising equitable mercy is 
warranted. Because life expectancies are increasing, and new medical 
advances allow people to live longer, prolonging the lives of terminally ill 
patients, grappling with the ramifications of compassionate homicide is a 
timely and pertinent endeavor.  
 
358. There is some historical evidence that compassionate homicide also occurred during the 
Holocaust, where parents had killed their children to prevent them from suffering the Nazis’ atrocities. 
In a mock trial of infamous Nazi doctor Josef Mengele, Holocaust survivor Ruth Eliaz gave testimony 
about killing her baby who had no chance of survival after she gave birth to it in Auschwitz. See Mother 
Tells of Killing Her Newborn Baby at Auschwitz: Mock Trial of ‘Angel of Death’ Ends in Israel, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 7, 1985, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-02-07-mn-5158-story 
.html [http s://perma.cc/Z5SY-NGUP]. Another case is described in the testimonial of Holocaust 
survivor Esther Handlarsky. During the last transport of Jews from Shedlitz to Treblinka in November 
1942, Handlarsky had witnessed a medical doctor injecting Cyanides to his wife, children, and himself, 
to prevent them from being sent to their death. Fourteen-year-old Esther begged the doctor to end her 
and her sister’s lives too, but he said that he did not have enough poison. Esther Handlarsky and her 
sister hid in the woods and eventually survived. Interview by Hanna Pasovsky-Kaplan with Esther 
Handlarksy, in Jerusalem, Israel (May 16, 2005) (interview on file with the author).  
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